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Abstract
Increasingly, commentators complain of two major deficiencies in modern tort
law: (1) that liability concepts such as “negligence” or ”duty” are so vacuously
defined as to permit inadvertent subjectivity and error to hinder proper case ad-
judication; (2) that tort is too slow in recognizing newly discovered risks and
properly compensating nascent classes of injury. We accordingly report on the
Kiodynamic Theory, an emerging philosophy that overcomes these twin deficien-
cies and sharpens understanding of poorly articulated tort intuitions. Kiodynam-
ics contends causation is the cornerstone of tort, and that all risks are, at core,
causal propositions. Contrary to its many everyday definitions, the word ”risk”
has a single exact meaning in Kiodynamic Theory. A risk, unlike uncertainties,
must be objectively known to be causally possible (”epistemically possible”). Put
differently, Kiodynamics prescribes that a specific alleged stimulus must be ob-
jectively known to cause a particular harm. Second, and in the only notable break
with traditional tort intuition, some Kiodynamic proponents advocate permitting
compensation only for injuries arising from ”significant” risks: those that are (1)
widespread and (2) also likely to be injurious. Similar to common regulatory prac-
tice, the prescriptive ”significant risk” constraint seeks to sensibly prioritize risk
deterrence, given limited judicial resources. Third, Kiodynamic Theory invokes
decision analysis - the method for formal, quantitative risk analysis universally
familiar to risk analysts - to elucidate risk tradeoffs and make decisions about a
risk’s costs and benefits. With its empirical grounding, decision analysis improves
upon other cost-benefit models, which are typically too theoretical or assumption-
laden for practical use. Finally, courts have long desired and intuitively but unsuc-
cessfully sought an objective method for apportioning liability for a single injury
among multiple alleged tortfeasors. Kiodynamic Theory is the first tort theory to
formally present such a method.
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ABSTRACT  
 Increasingly, commentators complain of two major deficiencies in modern tort law: (1) 
that liability concepts such as “negligence” or “duty” are so vacuously defined as to permit 
inadvertent subjectivity and error to hinder proper case adjudication; (2) that tort is too slow in 
recognizing newly discovered risks and properly compensating nascent classes of injury.  We 
accordingly report on the Kiodynamic Theory, an emerging philosophy that overcomes these twin 
deficiencies and sharpens understanding of poorly articulated tort intuitions.  
 Kiodynamics contends causation is the cornerstone of tort, and that all risks are, at core, 
causal propositions.  Contrary to its many everyday definitions, the word “risk” has a single exact 
meaning in Kiodynamic Theory.  A risk, unlike uncertainties, must be objectively known to be 
causally possible (“epistemically possible”).  Put differently, Kiodynamics prescribes that a 
change in a specific alleged stimulus must be objectively known to determine an asymmetric, 
directional change in a particular alleged harm. 
 Second, and in the only notable break with traditional tort intuition, some Kiodynamic 
proponents advocate permitting compensation only for injuries arising from “significant” risks: 
those that are (1) widespread and (2) also likely to be injurious.  Similar to common regulatory 
practice, the prescriptive “significant risk” constraint seeks to sensibly prioritize risk deterrence, 
given limited judicial resources. 
 Third, Kiodynamic Theory invokes decision analysis – the method for formal, 
quantitative risk analysis universally familiar to risk analysts – to elucidate risk tradeoffs and 
make decisions about a risk’s costs and benefits.  With its empirical grounding, decision analysis 
improves upon other cost-benefit models, which are typically too theoretical or assumption-laden 
for practical use.  
 Finally, courts have long desired and intuitively but unsuccessfully sought an objective 
method for apportioning liability for a single injury among multiple alleged tortfeasors.  
Kiodynamic Theory is the first tort theory to formally present such a method. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Those who have the happy fortune of attending law school recite forever more that duty, 
negligence, actual cause, proximate cause, and injury lead to Tort liability.   
Very well.  Define “duty.”   
There is one condition on this challenge: a definition must permit consistent prediction of 
case outcomes.  Consider the tradition definition: duty is the “foreseeability that harm may result 
if [the duty] is not exercised.”1  This definitional test of duty is surely not predictive; as far back 
as Palsgraf, there have been doubts about the efficacy of a “foreseeability” test in predicting 
duties.2  “Foreseeability” has proven to be a vacuous delimiter, which courts apply equally – but 
without consistency – in the distinguishable contexts of duty, negligence, and proximate cause.3 
In fact, “duty” has been so conceptually elusive that the California Supreme Court once 
said, “duty is not an immutable fact of nature but only an expression of the sum total of those 
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to 
protection.”4  When a notable court concedes in frustration that it cannot predict duties, it is 
unsettling.  Each day, law enforces sizeable – sometimes bankrupting – judgments against “duty-
violating” defendants.  They are the unhappy violators of a murky word.5 
                                                
1 Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 21 A.2d 402, 404 (Conn. 1941) (“The ultimate test of the existence of a duty to 
use care is found in the foreseeability that harm may result if it is not exercised.”), citing Botticelli v. 
Winters, 7 A.2d 443, 445 (Conn. 1939).  
2 Compare Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.) (“If no hazard was 
apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an act innocent and harmless, at least to outward seeming, with 
reference to her, did not take to itself the quality of a tort because it happened to be a wrong, though 
apparently not one involving the risk of bodily insecurity, with reference to some one else.”) with id. at 
103 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (“Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those 
acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. … [W]hen injuries do result from our unlawful 
act we are liable for the consequences.  It does not matter that they are unusual, unexpected, unforeseen 
and unforseeable.”). 
3 H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 273 (2nd ed. 1985) (“Liability in negligence has 
and must have its limits but it is not clear that foreseeability is an appropriate notion for settling them.”); 
Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Causation, Contribution, and Legal Liability: An Empirical 
Study, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 265, 274-75 (2001) (noting that “[i]n many [] cases, foreseeability 
plays a prominent role.  … [A]mong those that do, courts are not in accord as to whether the issue to 
which it relates is duty, proximate causation, or a generalized notion of negligence.  Some judges have 
recognized this disagreement among courts in analyzing this problem.”).  
4 Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 1968). 
5  See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 1 (2002) (observing that 
“a large fraction of legal scholarship makes at least some claims about the world based on observation or 
experience” rather than on proper scientifically measured bases). 
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Try defining “negligence” instead.  Yes, negligence means the “breach of a duty,” or the 
“breach of a foreseeable obligation,” but the first taxonomy is circular and the latter, again, 
ineffective.  They do not tell us how to predict negligence. 
Here is a final opportunity to justify law school tuition: what is “proximate cause”?  Even 
the most respectable courts are so confused by tort concepts that they sometimes equate duty and 
proximate cause, although this substitution is incorrect.6  Is proximate cause a limitation on 
liability only to those events that are “reasonably foreseeable”?7  (Observe that this standard is 
just a variation on the “foreseeability” test that has proven incapable of predictably delimiting 
case outcomes.)  Or is proximate cause a confessedly “political” and “arbitrary” restriction?8 
Unsettling looseness plagues basic definitions at the core of tort liability.  An occasional 
justification for this confusion is that tort law must accommodate multiple (sometimes mutually 
exclusive) aims.  These thinkers believe no single theory can represent tort’s scope.  But one 
leading scholar, Vanderbilt Professor John Goldberg, speaks for many when he rejects this view: 
 
Must we or ought we concede that all we can say of any given tort decision, or 
any given tort doctrine, is that, if well-rendered, it will reflect the attainment of 
an unarticulated and unarticulable balance among various considerations – 
including some that are diametrically opposed? …[T]o make such a concession is 
to give up on the idea of law.9 
                                                
6 Invoking “duty” when discussing proximate cause has dramatic procedural repercussions too, for 
proximate cause is ostensibly a jury question, while duty remains a judge question.  Dobbs describes the 
general confusion between proximate cause and duty well: 
 
 Many writers and some courts favor approaching scope of risk issues involved in 
proximate cause or legal cause decisions through the language of duty.  The great 
advantage of doing so is that the confusions engendered by use of causal language 
might be avoided. … Few if any judges can specialize in the diverse legal issues that 
confront them.  They cannot all be up-to-date experts in tort theory.  Consequently, 
when judges confront a problem already labeled as a proximate cause problem, the 
label alone is likely to have at least some subliminal effects that steer analysis in the 
wrong direction. 
 But…duty issues themselves are slippery chameleons.  Moreover, to cast an issue in 
terms of duty is to provide another subliminal suggestion – namely that the decision is 
to be made by judges rather than juries. 
 
DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS § 230 at 584. 
7 Poskus v. Lombardo’s of Randolph, Inc., 670 N.E.2d 383, 386 (Mass. 1996) (“There must be limits to the 
scope or definition of reasonable foreseeability based on considerations of policy and pragmatic 
judgment.”). 
8 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) (“What we do mean 
by the word ‘proximate’ is that because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the 
law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.  This is not logic.  It is practical 
politics.”). 
9 John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort, 90 GEO. L.J. 514, __ (2004). 
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Even if Professor Goldberg is right and tort does have articulable and coherent aims, 
current liability standards aren’t achieving them.  As we have seen, tort is based on vacuous (and 
therefore easily manipulated) terms.  To achieve better consistency and predictability in case 
outcomes, tort requires better standards for determining liability.10 
There is still a second dilemma tort faces beyond these inherent linguistic shortcomings.  
Commentators are now also acknowledging that tort – as it is practiced in courts and regardless of 
which particular theory one favors – does not sufficiently accommodate the expanding scope of 
contemporary risks and the accelerating pace of risk assessment and risk discovery.11  Professor 
Goldberg, for instance, has commented that: 
 
One may speculate that, in the near term, mechanized accidents will cease to 
provide the focal point of tort.  …  [I]t is quite possible that tort theorists soon 
will be required to provide … comprehensive and comprehending theories of 
tort, theories that see the ‘new negligence’ as part of a multi-faceted yet broadly 
coherent law of wrongs.12  
 
Tort law will have to adjust in two ways, then, to remain current and relevant to the 
remuneration of injuries caused in contemporary society.  First, it must create more exact and 
rigorous judicial tests of liability that better articulate long-standing tort law intuitions.  Next, a 
modern theory must accommodate changes in the alleged sources of injuries that are being 
litigated.   
Here, we report on the development of the Kiodynamic Theory,13 which is rapidly 
gaining support among academics and is starting to surface (anonymously, as yet) in courts as a 
considerable step in the direction of a unifying theory that reflects longstanding intuitions about 
                                                
10 Accord LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS __ (Basil Blackwell 1963) 
(“Language sets everyone the same traps; it is an immense network of easily accessible wrong turnings. 
And so we watch one man after another walking down the same paths and we know in advance where he 
will branch off, where walk straight on without noticing the side turning, etc. etc.  What I have to do then 
is erect signposts at all the junctions where there are wrong turnings so as to help people past the danger 
points.”). 
11 Stephen D. Sugarman, A Century of Change in Personal Injury Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2403, __ (2000) 
(“[T]he role of personal injury law at the end of the 21st century is probably as unpredictable as its current 
role was at the end of the 19th. Not only might personal injury law doctrine and the background institutions 
to tort law change significantly, but also technological advances may well change the pattern of accidental 
bodily injury that will exist 100 years from now in ways we cannot anticipate.”). 
12 John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort, 90 GEO. L.J. 514, __ (2004).   
13 The term “Kiodynamic” derives from the Greek “kiodynos” (“risk”). 
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tort, while offering considerably more flexibility over past theories to accommodate new alleged 
sources of injuries.14 
 
I(A). A CAPSULE INTRODUCTION TO THE KIODYNAMIC THEORY 
Many tort scholars emphasize the risk deterrence aspect of tort,15 yet common 
dictionaries contain a dozen different definitions of the word “risk.”  Even leading risk 
philosophers assert that a “risk” cannot be precisely defined.16  Tort scholars curiously have not 
commented on this striking conclusion, although it has sizeable repercussions for the courtroom.   
Proponents of Kiodynamic Theory contend that standardless or “common sense” notions 
of “risk” in place of a clear definition means assigning liability is inevitably an arbitrary, 
subjective enterprise, even though courts strive for objectivity.  A precise definition of risk 
removes ambiguity surrounding duty, negligence, and proximate cause and permits much more 
highly predictable and consistent case outcomes. 
Kiodynamic theorists believe risks are rigorously definable.  They contend that a 
judicially cognizable “risk” incorporates three distinct concepts: (1) a risk identifies an objectively 
known (“epistemic”) causal relationship between a stimulus “A” and a harmful/injurious effect 
“B” (sometimes expressed as “AB”); (2) a risk expresses a quantified frequency of occurrence 
(avoiding extrapolation) and that risk is sufficiently likely to result in harm, sufficiently 
widespread, and sufficiently costly as to merit judicial redress; (3) a risk involves an effect “B” 
that is undesirable (a “harm” or “injury”).17  Linguistically, therefore, a statement of “risk” 
                                                
14 KiodynamicTheory is both prescriptive and explanatory.  Its risk prioritization requirement is a logical, 
but never practiced, proposal for tort law.  Its clarification of tort definitions and delimiters, however, is 
not so much prescriptive, but rather an attempt to more precisely define intuitions that have underlay tort 
law throughout the past century.  Similarly, decision analysis, another element of Kiodynamics, is “new” 
to tort law, but including it in the theory does not make Kiodynamics prescriptive in that regard.  Instead, 
decision analysis is simply a more refined method of conducting cost-benefit considerations long 
accepted as an integral part of tort. 
15 There have been so many articles discussing this major focus of tort theory that it is not worthwhile to 
collect those writings here. 
16 See generally JOHN C. CHICKEN & TAMIL POSNER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RISK (1998). 
17 Because harms are subjective, there is obvious trouble in deciding whether a given effect is objectively 
undesirable (i.e. whether an effect “B” is a “harm” or rather, a “benefit”).  Moreover, objectively 
identifying the proper scope of an effect or harm “B” is hardly a trivial enterprise, either. The number of 
unwanted effects  created by a given stimulus varies with different acts.  For example, in one case 
defendants’ failure to clean a barge’s hold caused accumulation of explosive gases.  Johnson v. Kosmos 
Portland Cement Co., 64 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1933).  Lightning struck the barge, it exploded, and two men 
died.  The court, faced with an issue of deciding what the risk of harm was before it could find liability, 
chose to classify the “AB” risk broadly as “some intervening incendiary force.”  However, it could 
have framed the question much more narrowly as “the risk of lightning strike.”  Deciding how broadly to 
classify these liability-fixing attributes is in turn a function of how “dense” the number of untoward 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art16
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contains a causal, a numerical, and a nominative connotation: “There is a 10% (numerical) risk of 
lung cancer (nominative) from cigarette smoking (causal).”18 
What becomes immediately apparent from this definition is that a risk must be 
established not just numerically, but also causally.  Experts are often asked to determine “risks” 
even when there is insufficient knowledge of their causation (“AB”) or probabilities, or both.  
To deal with such gaps in knowledge, in some cases causality is inferred or simply assumed, as is 
a probability.  Still, the term “risk” is often invoked to describe such derivations or “discoveries.”  
In reality, what is being referred to are not risks, but rather causal possibilities or hypotheses 
(“uncertainties”).  Kiodynamic Theory demands, therefore, that the causal soundness of any 
judicially cognizable risk be established before all else.  This process is described in Sections II 
and III. 
In their only purely prescriptive break with traditional tort intuition, many (but not all) 
Kiodynamic theorists advocate compensation only for injuries arising from risks that are 
“significant,” that is, that: (1) are likely to result in injury (the risk is “injurious”) and (2) affect a 
large number of people or a sizeable amount of property (the risk is “widespread”).19  Similar to 
practices at some regulatory agencies,20 a “significance” requirement attempts to sensibly 
prioritize which risks to deter using limited judicial resources.  Section IV(a) discusses 
Kiodynamic risk “significance.” 
                                                                                                                                            
outcomes are associated with a stimulus in a particular context.  Accord id. at 197 (“The particular 
consequences of negligence are almost invariably surprises.  It is the unexpected rather than the expected 
that happens in the great majority of the cases of negligence.  It is not necessary [for liability to attach] 
that injury in the precise form in which it in fact resulted should have been foreseen.”); Stodola v. 
Grunwald Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 422 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Neb. 1988) (“The law does not require 
precision in foreseeing the exact hazard or consequence which happens.  It is sufficient if what occurs is 
one of the kind of consequences which might reasonably be foreseen.”).  Legal theorists, as they have 
come closer to understanding the true causal nature of risk, have also correctly perceived that framing (1) 
the scope of an injury and (2) the risk “density” is integral to defining a risk.  While these concepts of 
correctly framing the risk density and objectively identifying the scope of the harm or stimulus are quite 
important, we reserve discussion for a different day. 
18 Occasionally common parlance will refer only to an untoward effect as a risk, for example, “what is the 
risk of dying?”  Observe that this particular risk proposition doesn’t take exactly the same form as the 
four we state in the main text immediately below; it focuses upon a finite effect (death), but there is no 
cause identified.  We can understand this “risk” to be an aggregation – it asks for the likelihood of an 
effect summed across all causes.  Although risk propositions such as this are commonly referred to as 
“risks,” they are of little use for assigning individual causal blame and liability, as in legal circumstances.  
See note__ (von Buri footnote), infra. 
19 As is discussed in detail in Section __, infra, the injuriousness of a risk and the reach of the risk are 
inversely related variables under Kiodynamic Theory.  As the reach of a risk increases, the threshold 
injuriousness necessary for liability decreases, and vice-versa.. 
20 See note __ (Trav is), infra. 
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Kiodynamic Theory next calls for quantitative analysis of the social benefits and costs of 
the act, in context, which gave rise to the litigated injury.  Here, Kiodynamic Theory offers 
improvement at achieving the traditional goal of Learned Hand-style cost-benefit considerations 
when it introduces decision analysis – a staple method of quantitative risk analysis – to the legal 
arena.21  Section IV(b) describes decision analysis.22 
Assimilating considerations from Sections II through IV, Section V formally presents 
three fundamental Kiodynamic definitions: negligence, duty, and proximate cause (“proximate 
risk”).  
Finally, as Section VI reveals, Kiodynamic Theory is the first tort theory that is capable 
of precisely apportioning liability for a single injury among multiple potential contributors. 
In sum, the Kiodynamic Theory offers great promise as a predictable, consistent means of 
deterring risks caused by social actors and of remunerating injured plaintiffs. 
 
II.  CAUSALITY  
 Classic definitions of causality describe an external stimulus23 capable of producing 
internal change in an object (i.e. an “effect”) is the “cause” of that change.24  Symbolically, 
causality is represented as a “causal path,” AB, with an arrow between stimulus and effect:25 
                                                
21 Social justice theorists object to the utilitarian nature of Kiodynamic Theory.  Even among those who 
agree that an objective standard must be used in assessing risk (and some social justice theorists, 
curiously, do not even accept this obvious proposition), they contend that where a risk results in injury, 
recompense must follow.  Kiodynamic Theory acknowledges this argument as theoretically plausible.  
However, for a judicial system where litigation costs are more reminiscent of Soviet economies than a 
zero-transaction cost realm, Kiodynamic Theory stresses pragmatism over utopia: it allocates court time 
and resources towards redress of the most prevalent or deleterious risks first.  Kiodynamics contends that 
if the judicial system must deny justice to some (and it must because of limits on time and resources), 
better it would be to deny recovery for those who suffer from infrequently caused risks, as there would be 
less social deterrence resulting from such damage awards. 
22 This article does not fully address the strong contributions that the law and economics literature has 
made to tort theory, some of which have cast doubt under certain circumstances on the differentiation 
between negligence, intent, and strict liability.  See, e.g., Ronald Coase@cite. But see STEVEN SHAVELL, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 32-36 (1987) (demonstrating that in many instances, the answer 
to whether a negligence or strict liability rule is economically preferable is indeterminate).  Kiodynamic 
Theory is certainly capable of incorporating the economists’ critiques.  As the reader will see in Section 
IV(B) when we discuss decision analysis, however, the particular form of Kiodynamic Theory that we 
are reporting on maintains that distinction, in part because economists have not shown convincingly that 
courts would have the financial and time resources to handle strict liability cases the same as negligence 
– even if it might be net beneficial from a social standpoint. 
23 A stimulus in its broadest sense could be any act, omission, action, event, circumstance, element, 
occurrence, and so on, as long as it is something that exists.  Because tort law focuses on humans’ acts, 
when we speak of a “stimulus” after this introductory section, we will almost categorically be referring to 
anthropogenic stimuli – actions, omissions or creations by people in a context. 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art16
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Figure 1 
AB: A Causal Path 
 
 
 
The path arrow symbolizes causality, but it does not suggest a method for proving that a 
particular stimulus A “causes” a particular effect B.  Galileo sought to rectify this gap.  He 
postulated that an “efficient cause” exists where a stimulus A is both necessary and sufficient to 
the outcome B.26  
Causality to later thinkers like Pierre Laplace and John Stuart Mill was instead holistic: a 
universal interconnectedness, involving a number of stimuli and effects beyond human 
comprehension (and thus “infinite”).27  By this, every effect is the joint product of all stimuli that 
exist or have existed in the universe at any time prior to that effect.  By taking away any one 
                                                                                                                                            
24 ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS, bk. II, ch. 3, 194b5, at 28–29 (W. Charlton trans., Clarendon Press 1970) (350 B.C.E.)  
(defining efficient cause as “the primary source of the change or coming to rest; e.g., the man who gave 
advice is a cause, the father is cause of the child, and generally what makes of what is made and what 
causes change of what is changed”); ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, bk. I, ch. 3, 983a,b, (W.D. Ross ed., Clarendon 
Press 1924) (350 B.C.E.) (defining four elements of causality, including efficient cause). 
25 Causal chains involve multiple paths, sometimes with causality running bi-directionally, where our Dots 
represent both stimuli to subsequent effects and effects to antecedent stimuli.  See Christopher P. 
Guzelian, Liability & Fear, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, __ Figure 2 (2004). 
26 See Galileo, Il Saggiatore [The Assayer] in DISCOVERIES AND OPINIONS OF GALILEO 231, 231–80 (Stillman Drake 
trans., 1957) (1623). 
27 PIERRE-SIMON DE LAPLACE, PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON PROBABILITIES (Transl. by F. W. Truscott & F. 
L. Emory 1951) (stating Laplace’s Demon:  “We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect 
of its past and the cause of its future.  An intellect which at any given moment knew all of the forces that 
animate nature and the mutual positions of the beings that compose it, if this intellect were vast enough to 
submit the data to analysis, could condense into a single formula the movement of the greatest bodies of the 
universe and that of the lightest atom; for such an intellect nothing could be uncertain and the future just 
like the past would be present before its eyes.”); JOHN STUART MILL, SYSTEM OF LOGIC __ () (“[B]y the 
cause of an event one has to understand the totality of changing conditions, both positive and negative, 
which in their cooperation invariably and unconditionally result in the mentioned event.”). 
  Another significant protest, put forth in various statements by Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and 
Kant, was that causality might be nothing more than a relation – an entirely fictional mental construct.  
RENÉ DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY (1641); JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING 
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, book II, chap. xxvi, § 1 (1690); GEORGE BERKELEY, WORKS (passim) (1721); 
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, book I, part III, §§ ii-iv (1740); AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING 
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, § vii (1748); IMMANUEL KANT, KRITIK DER REINEN VERNUNFT (1787). One 
cannot and should not dismiss this possibility.  Yet we do not address the issue further.  If we are simply 
“brains in a vat,” significantly greater existential crises than whether a particular plaintiff should recover 
from a defendant for injury will arise! 
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stimulus, it would be impossible to know how that deletion would impact on the effect unless one 
knew the causal interconnectivity of all remaining stimuli in that universe.28  Because 
humanity’s knowledge is limited, Galileo’s efficient causality is unattainable. 
This holistic critique found advocates in the logical positivist movement (spearheaded by 
Bertrand Russell29), and confirmation in scientific fields like quantum mechanics30 and chaos 
theory.31  Holists rejected as fictitious any causal path between finite sets of stimuli and effects, 
such as in Figure 1, “as a thread external and parallel to the remaining threads.”32 
Although this attack was so persuasive that even Galilean diehards began to concede that 
“[s]trict causal lines or chains simply do not exist,”33  philosopher Mario Bunge explains that the 
isolation of artificial causal paths between finite numbers of stimuli “approximately” necessary 
and/or sufficient for a finite number of effects remains man’s best rough-and-ready method for 
the acquisition of knowledge: 
 
The isolation of a system from its surroundings, of a thing or process from its [infinite] 
context, of a quality from the complex of interdependent qualities to which it belongs – 
such “abstractions,” in short, are indispensable not only for the applicability of causal 
ideas but for any research, whether empirical or theoretical. …[I]t is the concern of 
science to analyze such mazes of interconnected elements, singling out a few entities and 
features, and focusing on them with the hope of attaining a better understanding of the 
whole after the singled-out parts have finally been replaced in it.  Holists complain that 
this procedure damages the totality concerned, and this is true; but analysis is the sole 
known method of attaining a rational understanding of the whole: first it is decomposed 
into artificially isolated elements, then an attempt is made to synthesize the components.  
The best grasp of reality is not obtained by respecting fact and avoiding fiction but by 
vexing fact and controlling fiction.34 
 
                                                
28 John Bernal explained this concept succinctly: “[C]hance variations or side reactions are always taking 
place.  These never completely cancel each other out, and there results an accumulation which sooner or 
later provides a trend in a different direction from that of the original system.”  JOHN D. BERNAL, THE 
FREEDOM OF NECESSITY 31 (1949). 
29 Bertrand Russell, On the Notion of Cause, in MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 188 (1908). 
30 See e.g., HENRI POINCARÉ, THERMODYNAMIQUE ix (1908) (“On the deterministic hypothesis the state of 
the universe is determined by an excessively large number, n, of parameters which I shall call x1, x2, …, 
xn.  If the value of these n parameters are known at any given instant, and their time derivatives are also 
known, then the values of the same parameters at a previous or at a later time can be calculated.”). 
31 See generally ILYA PRIGOGINE, THE END OF CERTAINTY: TIME, CHAOS, AND THE NEW LAWS OF 
NATURE (1998); JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987). 
32 MARIO BUNGE, CAUSALITY AND MODERN SCIENCE 132 (3rd ed. 1979). 
33 BUNGE, CAUSALITY AND MODERN SCIENCE at 133. 
34 Id. at 129. 
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 Bunge further suggests such finite causal paths or chains “afford both a satisfactory 
approximate picture [of universal interconnectness],” but only if the chains are drawn only “in 
particular respects, in limited domains, and for short time intervals.”35  
Although causality is an approximation of reality, establishing causality is emphatically 
not a subjective art.  Rather, as Bunge states, it is a process of “vexing fact and controlling 
fiction.”  Properly established risks embody an objectively good causal depiction.36  As the next 
section shall demonstrate, what is therefore required is a method by which to bifurcate risks 
(objectively known “epistemic” possibilities) and mere “uncertainties” (hypothetical causes of 
harm). 
 
III. RISK VS. UNCERTAINTY 
 
All proposed relationships between a given stimulus and a given effect are either possible 
or impossible.  Impossible are those that contradict logic or violate a known scientific law.  It is 
impossible (with apologies to string theorists) for a person to be in two places at once, for objects 
to fall “up” (against gravity), for a person to walk through a wall (two material objects cannot 
occupy the same space at the same time), or (with apologies to Michael Crichton) for a person to 
be devoured by a dinosaur (extinct animals can’t bite).  It follows that risks must not be 
impossible.  Consider, then, the following four propositions:37 
 
                                                
35 Id. at 133.  Indeed, even when approximations of reality are known to be less accurate than the “best” 
present human knowledge, such approximations may still be valid in certain contexts. Consider that 
Einstein’s theory of relativity displaced Newtonian force as the “proper” approximation of velocities 
approaching light speed, yet Newtonian force equations are still taught in introductory physics classes 
and were employed in sending men to the moon.  So too is finite causality a sufficient everyday means to 
categorizing relationships.  We don’t need quantum mechanics to build a bridge.  Chaotic or quantum 
events that radically defy causal models do not typically impinge meaningfully on our daily lives or even 
on most scientific investigation.  This fact permits finite causality to persist so hardily. Yet, in all of this, 
we cannot stress often or mightily enough that nearly all thinkers agree there is no such thing as a “true” 
(Laplacian) causal pairing, every stimulus and effect construct is confined to Box III.  Finite causality is 
not Laplacian causality.  To be sure, many Box III pairings look like Box I, II, or IV relations; shooting 
someone in the head with a high-caliber hollow-point bullet, for instance, seems like a sufficient, but not 
a necessary, “cause” of physical injury of death – Box II.  But the temptation to classify this act as such 
must be resisted.  No amount of empirical investigation, indeed nothing short of infinite knowledge, 
shakes any causal construct of its Box III moorings. 
36 Without such objectivity, “remedies” based on bogus “risks” admit clearly undesirable battling of 
fictitious fire-breathing dragons, and punishes “wrongdoers” who are accused (subjectively and 
sometimes absent any appropriate evidence) of “creating” harms. 
37 Harvard physicist Dick Wilson helped motivate these scenarios.  See Richard Wilson, Technology and 
Society: Ensuring Sound Science in the Courts, 26 TECH. IN SOCIETY 501 (2004). 
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(1) What is your risk of being trampled by a non-equine horse? 
(2) What is your risk of being trampled by a horse galloping faster than the speed of light? 
(3) What is your risk of being trampled by a four-legged alien? 
(4) What is your risk of being trampled by a horse? 
 
Kiodynamics, in establishing whether a proposition is indeed a “risk,” first examines 
whether the proposed method of causing harm is possible and known, and then answers what the 
probability of each proposition’s occurrence is, as we do now for the four propositions: 
 
 Scenario 1.  Horses, by definition, are equine.  A non-equine horse is what Plato called a 
logical impossibility;38 it is impossible because it requires an object to embody a principle and its 
logical opposite.  Because such a creature is impossible, we are inclined to say that the 
probability of being trampled by one is zero. 
 Scenario 2 impossibly violates Einstein’s laws of relativity. The justification for 
impossibility, however, is not the same as in the first scenario.  A warp speed horse is not 
illogical.  But it defies a natural law, and one concludes that Scenario 2 is impossible.  (By 
extension, the probability of being trampled is zero.) 
 Scenario 3.  Self-professed alien abductees aside, currently there isn’t convincing 
evidence of alien life.  But insomuch as the notion contravenes no law of nature, it is formally 
possible that a four-legged alien could exist and could trample someone. (We should resist the 
urge to quickly add that this harm is quite unlikely to occur, to avoid co-mingling the causal and 
numerical aspects of risk.  This is a point we shall return to momentarily.) 
 Scenario 4.  It is “possible” to be trampled by a horse – there are numerous historical and 
ongoing examples of such accidents. Estimating the probability of particular person’s being 
trampled would then require understanding such circumstances as place and time. 
 
 The four scenarios suggest that merely stating the possibility of a relationship, AB, as a 
quantified probability doesn’t suffice to establish that AB is a risk.  There are three classes of 
possibility: (1) logical, (2) nomological, and (3) epistemic.  A possibility must be logical; a “non-
equine horse” cannot be included in a causal chain.  A possibility must also be nomological (i.e. 
comply with laws of nature); the alleged owner of a warp-speed horse cannot be held legally 
                                                
38 See e.g., PLATO, MENO passim (1980, trnsltd. by G.M.A. Grube) (invoking Socratic “elenchus” to prove 
logical impossibilities). 
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liable.39  These are easy requirements.  But for alien tramplings and ordinary horse tramplings, 
observe one cannot rule out the “possibility” of each causal relationship – each is a nomological 
possibility.  Nomological possibilities are causal uncertainties, conjectures, hypotheses.  They 
await confirmation, might in some cases have been partly corroborated through scientific 
investigation, but are either not yet scientifically known “facts,” or, if they at one time had 
achieved such “factual” status, have reverted to mere uncertainties because of newer 
contradictory evidence.  Thus, an alien trampling is nomologically possible, even if it is 
unknown.40  
Epistemic possibilities, in contrast, are those nomological possibilities that are objectively 
known – causal relations that are objective “facts” on the basis of the best scientific evidence at a 
given moment in time.41  A trampling by an ordinary horse is known – it has happened before, 
continues to happen in modern times, and is expectable as long as man and horse interact.  
A risk is based only on epistemic possibility.  In this past century, there has been 
insufficient discussion by philosophers or legal theorists of this need.42  But a few late-19th and 
early-20th century European thinkers, beginning with German physiologist and epistemologist, 
Johannes von Kries, recognized it.43  In a forgotten but important 1886 publication,44 von Kries 
                                                
39 How scientific laws are established is, like any issue of knowledge, a topic for epistemologists.  We 
leave this debate to them, insomuch as it is not hugely important for our purposes of distinguishing 
nomological from epistemic possibility.  The interested reader can see IGOR HANZEL, THE CONCEPT OF 
SCIENTIFIC LAW IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND EPISTEMOLOGY: A STUDY OF THEORETICAL 
REASON (1999); JOHN CARROLL, LAWS (1993); DAVID ARMSTRONG, WHAT IS A LAW OF NATURE? 
(1983); Carl G. Hempel & Paul Oppenheim, Studies in the Logic of Explanation, in CARL G. HEMPEL, 
ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION (1965); Carl G. Hempel, Postscript (1964) to Studies in the Logic 
of Explanation, in CARL G. HEMPEL, ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION (1965). 
40 Compare EUGENE F. MALLOVE & GREGORY L. MATLOFF, THE STARFLIGHT HANDBOOK (1989) 
(restricting discussion of space travel to present and reasonably anticipated technologies), with JOHN H. 
MAULDIN, PROSPECTS FOR INTERSTELLAR TRAVEL (1992) (discussing nomological possibilities of space 
travel, including space warps, Zero Point Energy and Higgs fields). 
41 Philosophers might find our term “epistemic possibility” ambiguous, because “epistemic” simply means 
“known” possibility.  An epistemic possibility could be “subjectively” known or “objectively” known.  
By “epistemic,” we are referring only to “objectively known” possibilities.  We prefer “epistemic” 
because the word “objective” has too much linguistic baggage attached already.  
42 Contra Stordahl v. Rush Implement Co., 417 P.2d 95, 99 (Mont. 1966) (“Whenever a medical expert 
testifies that an asserted cause of disease is possible, this alone is not to be accepted as reasonable 
medical proof.”) (emphasis in original). 
43 Prior to von Kries, the reigning causality theorist was Maximilian von Buri, whose conception of 
causality-as-applied-in-law was Laplacian: 
 
[T]he German criminal jurist, von Buri, [] developed the theory of conditio sine qua non 
in the sense of a so-called doctrine of equivalence.  Since all cooperating conditions 
within the [Laplacian] causal relation are equally necessary no one of them could be 
eliminated without at the same time canceling the effect, and since determining their 
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railed against use of quantified probabilities for which the underlying “possibility” is not 
objectively known.45  To resolve possibility in any other fashion or, worse, to ignore it, would 
make probabilities appear to reflect causal inference when in fact they might not.   
What has been missing, however, is a consistent, objective methodology by which to 
separate epistemic possibilities from nomological ones.  The dividing “line” is sometimes a fuzzy 
boundary, within which it is occasionally open to debate whether a given stimulus-and-effect 
relationship is epistemically known.  But the exception does not undercut the rule.  Most pitches 
are called either balls or strikes based on a predefined strike zone, even if some close pitches 
spawn controversy.  The existence of legitimate debate over how to classify some possibilities 
that rest at the interface does not disprove the logic of a dichotomous categorization.   
Said differently, most proposed AB relationships are not murky or difficult to assess.  
Alien tramplings are not “known.”  They are only hypothetical possibilities according to the best 
scientific evidence.  Von Kries would say that while alien tramplings are nomologically possible, 
it is illegitimate and deceitful to then state a quantified “risk” of an alien trampling.46  Instead, 
                                                                                                                                            
greater or lesser quantitative operations transcends human cognitive ability, he 
formulated the statement that all conditions are equal in value.… [Von Buri concluded] 
that every conditio sine qua non may separately be viewed as a cause [in law], when all 
others are given. 
 
 HERMAN DOOYEWEERD, 2 ESSAYS IN LEGAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 40 (1996).  Von Buri 
recognized that determining Laplacian causality is beyond human capability.  To avoid this problem, he 
concluded that legal causality should be inferred equally for each condition.  This doctrine of 
equivalence has a homespun “equality” appeal, but everything in the universe has such Laplacian causal 
properties.  Under the doctrine of equivalence, the judge who sentences a murderer is also a cause of that 
murder, simply because the judge existed at the time it occurred.  Because the doctrine of equivalence 
admits such silly propositions, it isn’t useful for establishing liability. 
44 JOHANNES VON KRIES, PRINCIPIEN DER WAHRSCHEINLICHKEITSRECHNUNG (1886, repr. 1927).  It is said 
that von Kries’s work on epistemic possibilities (“objective Möglichkeiten”) had sizeable influence on John 
Maynard Keynes’s later work on uncertainty. 
45 “When we say that a certain Event (Occurence) is to be expected with a specific, quantified probability, 
we have made the positive claim therein that the relevant Event is bounded by a certain ‘Relationship 
Space,’ (Verhaltungs-Spielraum) which is limited in scope as a result of the imprecision of our 
knowledge.  … every probability expression therefore contains (causal) knowledge of objective meaning 
at its core.   .... There are several easily recognizable and essentially different parts to this knowledge.  
First, there must be a certain knowledge of the actual relation according to measures that define the 
essential Relationship Space of the probability.  This same knowledge must also, at least partially, be 
imprecise in the aforementioned sense [of Relationship Space]; in another way, however, it is essential 
that the knowledge be precise.  (For example, the quantified relationship between the amounts in relation 
to each other.)”  
 Id. at __(translation by Christopher Guzelian). 
46 Thus, von Kries would disapprove of the Drake Equation, an equation formulated in 1961 that 
supposedly offers a means of estimating the probability of other intelligent life in the universe.  See 
http://www.seti-inst.edu/science/drake-bg.html (describing the Drake Equation “factors” including in 
computing the probability of intelligent alien life). 
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Kiodynamic Theorists refer to such unknown possibilities as “uncertainties.”47  This is because 
such propositions are predicated on an insufficiently corroborated hypothesis (i.e. a hypothesis 
backed by assumptions), rather than on what is known.48  The distinctions between “known 
impossibilities” (those propositions that either defy logic or known natural laws) and 
“nomological possibilities,” and the further bifurcation of nomological possibilities into “risks” 
and “uncertainties” has been represented elsewhere as a flow diagram:49 
 
Figure 2 
Establishing Whether a Proposition is a Risk 
                                                
47 The reader must take care not to confuse the Kiodynamic definition of “uncertainty” with lay 
definitions, or, for that matter, with the way some who have overlooked the causal prerequisite to 
establishing a “risk” use the word: to describe those nomological possibilities – both known and 
unknown – for which a reliable probability is not easily ascertained.  See, e.g., Richard Posner, A Few 
Closing Thoughts, LESSIG BLOG (Aug. 29, 2004) (“There is an old but still useful distinction between 
‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’, the former referring to contingencies to which a probability can be attached, the 
latter to contingencies to which no probability can be attached.  The former is the domain of insurance 
and cost-benefit analysis.  The latter?  No one can assign a probability to any given time, place, or 
manner of a terrorist attack within a very broad range (obviously some possibilities can be excluded); and 
yet we have to take counterrorist [sic] measures; we have, in short, to manage uncertainty as well as 
risk.”), available at: http://lessig.org/blog/archives/posner.shtml. 
48 To be sure, self-proclaimed UFO abductees will insist that their personal encounters make alien 
tramplings known, not just nomological possibilities.  But if courts simply accept anecdotal, improperly 
selective, or subjective evidence that does not reflect the “best” scientific evidence (or even of opinions 
advanced by a professed “authority” or “expert”), separation of nomological and epistemic possibilities 
cannot occur. 
49 Table adapted from Philip S. Guzelian et al., Evidence-Based Toxicology, 24 HUMAN & EXPERIMENTAL 
TOXICOLOGY __ (in press, 2005).  @NEED TO GET © RELEASE FOR THE TABLE@ 
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In 1956, Harvard Medical School Dean Sydney Burwell succinctly identified the 
fundamental epistemological problem in assessing what is objectively “known” at any given time 
when he stated: “My students are dismayed when I say to them ‘Half of what you are taught as 
medical students will in 10 years have been shown to be wrong.  And the trouble is, none of your 
teachers knows which half.’”50  Burwell’s quote illustrates that causality is tied to a definite 
moment in time.  At one moment, a relation AB may reflect the best scientific knowledge, but 
not earlier or later.  Scientific explanation builds causal paths and chains, and then deconstructs51 
                                                
50 G.W. Pickering, The Purpose of Medical Education, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 113, 115 (1956). 
51 Deconstructing finite causal chains in an infinite causal nexus might seem like “proving the negative” – 
demonstrating that a relation does not exist.  Strictly speaking, proving the negative is impossible for any 
infinite set.  Nonetheless, because of something that Michael Martin calls the Negative Evidence Principle, 
we can approximately and objectively “prove” the absence, just as we can objectively “prove” the existence 
of a finite causal chain: 
 
A person is justified in believing that X does not exist if (1) all the available evidence 
used to support the view that X exists is shown to be inadequate; and (2) X is the sort of 
entity that, if X exists, then there is a presumption that [there] would be evidence 
adequate to support the view that X exists; and (3) this presumption has not been defeated 
although serious efforts have been made to do so; and (4) the area where evidence would 
appear, if there were any, has been comprehensively examined; and (5) there are no 
acceptable beneficial reasons to believe that X exists. 
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and reconstructs links as compelling contradictory or corroboratory evidence is found.  This 
explanatory process is not always progressive.  The Dark Ages, in which anecdotal experience, 
ungrounded hypotheses, unscientific alchemy, and mythos reigned caused loss of public 
knowledge.52  Scientific “explanations” are no less immune to fashion or to fancy than fiction 
itself if they do not derive from an objective protocol.53 
Thus, according to Kiodynamic Theory, an objective, consistent metric for “knowing 
what we know” at a given time54 is essential.  Without such, some of the most taken-for-granted 
“facts” or so-called “risks” – even when advocated by well-regarded authorities55 – turn out to be 
                                                                                                                                            
MICHAEL MARTIN, ATHEISM: A PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION 283 (1992).  These elements of the 
Negative Evidence Principle are incorporated into Evidence-Based Logic (EBL), the method for 
determining epistemic possibility. 
52 See, e.g., Michael Minnicino, The New Dark Age: The Frankfurt School and ‘Political Correctness’, 1 
FIDELIO __ (1992) (contending that “Frankfurt School” of academia, public opinion polls, infotainment, 
and political correctness are causing a deconstruction of modern culture and scientific knowledge akin to 
the Dark Ages’ regression), available at: http://www.schillerinstitute.org/fid_91-96/921_frankfurt.html. 
53 See, e.g., AMERICAN COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND HEALTH, FACTS VERSUS FEARS: A REVIEW OF THE 
GREATEST UNFOUNDED HEALTH SCARES OF RECENT TIMES (3rd ed. 1999) (reviewing the deleterious 
effects of 25 prominent fear epidemics based on uncertainties or minute risks, including the 1959 
Cranberry Scare, Red Dye Number 2, saccharin, hair dyes, Three Mile Island, and cellular phones); 
CARL SAGAN, BROCA’S BRAIN: REFLECTIONS ON THE ROMANCE OF SCIENCE Chpts. 5-9 (1974) 
(recounting various historical anecdotes of “Paradoxers” – pseudoscientists – who propagated 
widespread myths). 
54 It is critical that we understand that an epistemic possibility is linked to a specific moment in time.  
What is epistemic today may tomorrow become nomological because of objectively compelling new 
evidence that disputes that finite causal path or chain.  Conversely, what is nomological today may 
tomorrow become epistemic because of objectively compelling new evidence that corroborates the 
nomological (hypothesized) causal relation. 
55 Philip S. Guzelian & Christopher P. Guzelian, Authority-Based Explanation, 303 SCIENCE 1468, 1469 
(2004) (“Uncritical acceptance of authority-based opinions as conclusive evidence is pervasive, even 
though top authorities unsuccessfully predict what scientific knowledge will be preserved as ‘fact.’”).  
Dr. David Sackett explains that reliance on expert medical opinions, which themselves are not based 
upon an objective methodology, poses a jeopardy of improperly bestowing epistemic status upon 
nomological possibilities:  
 
 For the problems we’re likely to encounter very infrequently ([for example]…a man 
who developed bad pneumonia while trying to reject his heart-lung transplant), we 
“blindly” seek, accept, and apply the recommendations we receive from authorities in 
the relevant branch of medicine.  This “replicating” mode also characterizes the 
practice of medical students and clinical trainees when they haven’t yet been granted 
independence and have to carry out the orders of their consultants.  The trouble with 
the “replicating” mode is that it is “blind” to whether the advice received from the 
experts is authoritative (evidence-based, resulting from their [objective appraisal of 
evidence consistent with “best evidence” methods]) or merely authoritarian (opinion-
based, resulting from pride and prejudice).… If we tracked the care we give when 
operating in the “replicating” mode into the literature and [objectively] appraised it, we 
would find that some of it was effective, some useless, and some harmful.  But in the 
“replicating” mode we’ll never be sure which. 
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nothing more than uncertainties.  Consider, for instance, the dogma in early 19th Century France 
that phlebotomies (bleeding of patients) cured cholera.56  Until the 1980s, generations of doctors 
– persuaded by authorities whose entire careers were devoted to proving that peptic ulcers were 
an acid problem – administered milk and bland diets and performed selective vagatomies and 
antrectomies only to be shown by a young resident, Barry Marshall, that the disease is a bacterial 
                                                                                                                                            
DAVID L. SACKETT ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: HOW TO PRACTICE AND TEACH EBM 5 (2d ed. 
2000).  Daniel Friedland and his co-authors compare “traditional” (authority-based) and “evidence-based” 
assumptions as applied in medicine: 
 
Evidence-based medicine is a movement that has developed to help us make [] decisions 
with our patients systematically.  This movement is represented by a recent profusion of 
literature and course work in evidence-based medicine, and...has been characterized as a 
paradigm shift. 
The traditional medical paradigm comprises four assumptions: 
1. Individual clinical experience provides the foundation for diagnosis, treatment, and 
prognosis.  The measure of authority is proportional to the weight of individual 
experience. 
2. Pathophysiology provides the foundation for clinical practice. 
3. Traditional medical training and common sense are sufficient to enable a physician to 
evaluate new tests and treatments. 
4. Clinical experience and expertise in a given subject area are a sufficient foundation to 
enable the physician to develop clinical practice guidelines. 
The new evidence-based medicine paradigm comprises a different set of assumptions: 
1. When possible, clinicians use information derived from systematic, reproducible, and 
unbiased studies to increase their confidence in the true prognosis, efficacy of therapy, and 
usefulness of diagnostic tests. 
2. An understanding of pathophysiology is necessary but insufficient for the practice of 
clinical medicine. 
3. An understanding of certain rules of evidence is necessary to evaluate and apply the 
medical literature effectively. 
 
DANIEL J. FRIEDLAND ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: A FRAMEWORK FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE 2 
(1998).  See also George Wright et al., An Empirical Test of the Relative Validity of Expert and Lay 
Judgments of Risk, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 1107, 1118 (2002) (finding that underwriters – risk assessment 
experts – are little better at estimating certain risk measures than laypersons because of lack of objective 
feedback); G. Rowe & George Wright, Expert systems in insurance: A review and analysis, 2 INT’L J. 
INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS IN ACCOUNTING, FINANCE, AND MANAGEMENT 129 (1993) (concluding there is 
little evidence that experts are more veridical than laymen in risk assessment); contra Paul Slovic et al., 
Characterizing perceived risk, in PERILOUS PROGRESS: MANAGING THE HAZARDS OF TECHNOLOGY 91-125 
(1985) (R.W. Kates et al., eds.) (reaching opposite conclusions, but criticized by Wright et al. (2002) for 
lack of statistical power and for use of a heterogeneous panel of experts). Observe that courts sometimes 
reference doctors’ opinions in exactly the manner that Sackett finds objectionable; one is not certain 
whether the physician found the risk to be epistemic on the basis of the evidence, or on his authority alone.  
See Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 498 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1985) (“[T]he fear complained of 
by plaintiffs, in light of all the facts and circumstances, cannot be deemed to be idiosyncratic or unexpected 
in ‘normally constituted people.’  Plaintiffs have been told by their doctors of the increased risk and the 
need for medical surveillance to monitor for potential cancerous developments.”). 
56 Paris clinician Pierre Louis dispelled this belief through systematic examination of patients.  See PIERRE 
LOUIS, RECHERCHES SUR LES EFFETS DE LA SAIGN´EE DANS QUELQUES MALADIES INFLAMMATOIRES: ET SUR 
L’ACTION DE L’´EM´ETIQUE ET DES V´ESICATOIRES DANS LA PNEUMONIE (1835), reprinted by The Classics 
of Medicine Library, Birmingham, Alabama, 1986. 
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infection.57  More recently, a generation of well-meaning cardiologists put their postmenopausal 
patients at risk of cancer and heart disease through estrogen treatments that were widely and 
incorrectly believed, ironically, to reduce heart disease.58  And in a most recent and shocking 
                                                
57 Rachel K. Sobel, Heroes: Barry Marshall: A gutsy gulp changes medical science, USNEWS.COM 
(August 20, 2001), available at: http://www.usnews.com/usnews/doubleissue/heroes/marshall.htm. 
58 David Herrington and Timothy Howard tout the newfound realization that this untested 
hypothesis-turned-dogma could have been easily prevented: 
 
During the past decade, postmenopausal hormone therapy became one of the most 
frequently prescribed therapies in the United States, with a highly diversified portfolio of 
presumed benefits for postmenopausal women. The belief that hormone therapy might 
reduce a woman’s risk of coronary heart disease contributed considerably to its 
widespread use.  Beginning in 1998, results from a series of randomized clinical trials, … 
have clearly demonstrated that hormone therapy does not slow the clinical or anatomical 
progression of established coronary disease, nor does it prevent clinical cardiovascular 
events in previously healthy women.  Indeed, data from the Women’s Health Initiative 
(WHI), in conjunction with data from several other trials with clinical end points, suggest 
that hormone therapy may even increase cardiovascular risk. … 
The simple and intuitively appealing concept that replacing estrogen lost during 
menopause would be beneficial was easy for both patients and physicians to believe.  
This fact, coupled with impressive indirect evidence of a cardioprotective effect and 
growing awareness of the need for effective means to treat and prevent heart disease in 
women, made for a nearly unshakable belief in the benefits of hormone therapy.  As a 
result, many people suspended ordinary standards of evidence concerning medical 
interventions and concluded that hormone therapy was the right thing to prevent heart 
disease in millions of postmenopausal women — despite the absence of any large-scale 
clinical trials quantifying its overall risk–benefit ratio.  
Not surprisingly, when the initial randomized clinical trials failed to show a 
cardiovascular benefit, the results were heavily criticized and, in some cases, disregarded 
in lieu of the less credible evidence that fit the prevailing paradigm. …  
The lesson is that belief, no matter how sincerely held, is no substitute for proof... 
Similarly, observational or mechanistic studies, animal models, and basic research have 
tremendous value for the generation of hypotheses but should not be used to justify 
broad-based pharmacologic interventions. 
 
David M. Herrington & Timothy D. Howard, From Presumed Benefit to Potential Harm – Hormone 
Therapy and Heart Disease, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 519, 519 (2003).  See also Lars Holmberg & Herald 
Anderson, HABITS (hormonal replacement therapy for breast cancer – is it safe?), a randomised 
conparison: trial stopped, LANCET ONLINE (2004) (randomized trials ended because of unacceptable 
recurrence of breast cancer in women using estrogen therapy), available at: 
http://image.thelancet.com/extras/03let12260web.pdf.  And as another author observes, there were 
published indications as early as 1986 which would have offered an evidence-based practitioner insight 
into the dubious value of estrogen therapy: 
 
 As long ago as 1986 Diana Petitti and colleagues showed that HRT was apparently 
equally protective against accidental and violent deaths in an observational study as it 
was against cardiovascular disease deaths.  They pointed out that given the lack of any 
biologically plausible link between HRT and these external causes of death both 
associations should be suspected of suffering from residual confounding. 
 
 D. Lawlor et al., Commentary: The hormone replacement–coronary heart disease conundrum: 
is this the death of observational epidemiology?, 33 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY  464 (2004). 
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finding, the longstanding, universal use of corticosteroids to patients with traumatic head injury, 
although justified by seemingly sound pathophysiological explanations to reduce brain swelling, 
has been shown in a recent well-designed randomized trial to result in a sizeable increase in 
deaths in the treated cohort.  This unsettling discovery prompted editorialists to conclude that, 
“[a]dministration of corticosteroids to brain-injured patients has seemingly caused more than 
10,000 deaths during the 1980s and earlier” and that “The key message . . . is that applying 
treatments with unproven effectiveness is like flying blindly.”59 
Courts too are starting to see the need to divide risks and uncertainties.  One federal judge 
found that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, which first promoted the now-accepted 
dogma that second-hand cigarette smoke causes lung cancer, had no objective basis at the time 
for that proclamation.60  Former Yale and Pennsylvania Law Dean and federal judge Louis 
Pollak preliminarily concluded only two years ago that there was no objective basis for presenting 
“evidence” that a murder suspect’s fingerprints were identical to those later taken by authorities, 
despite a century of fingerprinting’s evidentiary use and a professional requirement that multiple 
experts examine each pair of prints.61 
Thanks to remarkable advances in informatics and database searchability, one can now 
objectively judge much causal “knowledge” without relying on popular, unfounded, or 
incompletely founded opinion.  This method is referred to as “best evidence” or “evidence-based 
logic” (“EBL”).  Medicine, dentistry, engineering, computer science, veterinary science, 
insurance companies and HMOs,62 human toxicology,63 library science,64 and even professional 
                                                
59 S. Sauerland & M. Maegele, A CRASH landing in severe head injury, 364 LANCET 1291 
(2004). 
60 Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 4 F.Supp.2d 435 (M.D.N.C. 1998) 
(rejecting EPA “research finding” that second-hand cigarette smoke causes lung cancer for lack of 
objective evidence). 
61 Adrian Cho, Fingerprinting Doesn’t Hold Up as a Science in Court, 295 SCIENCE 418 (2002).  See also 
Exxon Corp. v. Makofski, 116 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (conducting preliminary EBL review to 
assess whether benzene contamination of aquifer caused plaintiffs’ ailments). 
62 See Christopher P. Guzelian, Liability & Fear, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, __ (2004) (listing cites for 
evidence-based medicine, dentistry, engineering, computer science, veterinary science, and insurance 
companies). 
63 Philip S. Guzelian et al., Evidence-Based Toxicology, HUMAN & EXPERIMENTAL TOXICOLOGY (in press, 
2004). 
64 Jonathan D. Eldredge. Evidence-based librarianship: an overview, 88 BULL. MED. LIBR. ASSOC. 289 
(2000). 
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baseball65 have adopted EBL to gauge what is “known” (i.e. an epistemic possibility) at a 
particular time.  EBL is being described elsewhere in the literature in great detail;66 here, it 
suffices to note that EBL exists and is being recognized as the best method for objectively 
distinguishing risks and uncertainties.67  
 Admittedly, many regulatory agencies, public advocacy groups, crisis managers, and 
safety experts advise that certain actions (such as evacuations, waste cleanups, restricted product 
usage, etc.) be taken even if only a nomological possibility of harm (i.e., an “uncertainty”) exists. 
Journalists or government officials often warn about uncertainties.68  Such regulation, warnings, 
and reporting is defended by reference to the Precautionary Principle: better safe than sorry.69  
                                                
65 See MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (Norton 2003) (describing 
rudimentary EBL-style steps recently taken by the Oakland Athletics to maximize chances of making the 
playoffs with the league’s lowest-salaried roster). 
66 For a particularly instructive overview of EBL, see Philip S. Guzelian et al., Evidence-Based 
Toxicology, 24 HUMAN & EXPERIMENTAL TOXICOLOGY __ (in press, 2005). 
67 Whether a single method for addressing general and specific causation can exist is open to the most 
basic epistemological debates.  See Christopher Hitchcock, Probabilistic Causation § 6.3, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2002) (citing specific/general causation dichotomy literature and noting 
“we make at least two different kinds of causal claim, singular and general.  With this distinction in 
mind, we may note that [] counterexamples … are all formulated in terms of singular causation.  So one 
possible reaction to [] counterexamples … would be to maintain that a probabilistic theory of causation is 
appropriate for general causation only, and that singular causation requires a distinct philosophical 
theory.  One consequence of this move is that there are (at least) two distinct species of causal relation, 
each requiring its own philosophical account – not an altogether happy predicament.”), available at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-probabilistic/.  EBL recognizes this fundamental tension 
between specific and general causation exists and attempts to resolve both forms of causation adequately, 
as courts increasingly demand be done.  See e.g., DAVID L. SACKETT ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED 
MEDICINE: HOW TO PRACTICE AND TEACH EBM 80-87 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing proper protocols for 
application of EBL to specific patients, in light of patients’ unique attributes); Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 
1222, 1229-30 (Del. 2004) (in case involving biomechnical expert testimony, holding that 
“[e]xtrapolating from general [] principles to demonstrative evidence that supports or disproves injury to 
an individual may not be reliable in every case.  We, therefore, hold that a trial judge may admit [] expert 
opinion that a particular injury did (or did not) result from the forces of an accident only where the trial 
judge determines that the testimony reliably creates a connection between the reaction of the human body 
generally to the forces generated by the accident and the specific individual allegedly injured or another 
determinative fact in issue.”). 
68 This observation shouldn’t be taken to mean that communicating uncertainties or rare risks should be 
wholly disallowed.  But the risk communicator must think about how his audience is going to perceive the 
information he presents.  If it is an uncertainty, the audience must perceive it as that, not as a risk grounded 
in epistemic possibility.  See Christopher P. Guzelian, Liability & Fear, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 713 (2004) 
(advocating that negligent risk communicators be assigned liability for clinically serious emotional harms 
or fears caused by errant risk communication). 
69 V. Dethlefsen et al., The Precautionary Principle: Towards Anticipatory Environmental Management, 
in TIM JACKSON (ED.) CLEAN PRODUCTION STRATEGIES (1993); Commission of the European 
Communities, Communication from the commission on the precautionary principle 3 (2000) (maintaining 
that some applications of the precautionary principle are valid, but stressing “[r]ecourse to the 
precautionary principle presupposes that potentially dangerous effects deriving from a phenomenon, 
product or process have been identified, and that scientific evaluation does not allow the risk to be 
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The Precautionary Principle has critics; some say that it encourages wasteful, ad hoc expenditures 
on uncertainties at the expense of efficient resource allocation toward reducing risks.70  The 
debate is an interesting one, but which side has the better of it doesn’t matter for common law tort 
                                                                                                                                            
determined with sufficient certainty”), available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/com/cnc/2000/com2000_0001en01.pdf. 
70  Elizabeth Wheelan, president of the American Council on Science and Health, critiques the 
precautionary principle: 
 
There are [] at least two reasons why the precautionary principle itself, when applied in 
its extreme, is a hazard, both to our health and our high standard of living.  First, if we act 
on all the remote possibilities in identifying causes of human disease, we will have less 
time, less money and fewer general resources left to deal with the real public health 
problems which confront us.  This does not mean that before we take prudent action to 
protect public health we have to dot every scientific “i” and cross every environmental 
“t”.  It does mean that we should not let the distraction of purely hypothetical threats 
cause us to lose sight of the known or highly probable ones. 
Second, the precautionary principle assumes that no detriment to health or the 
environment will result from the proposed new banning or chemical regulation. 
When we apply the precautionary principle and focus on hypothetical risks and ponder 
what actions we might take “just in case”, we leave the world of science and enter the 
realm of ideology.  We allow ourselves to come under the spell of those who are 
motivated, for whatever reason, by a desire to return to what they perceive as a pre-
industrial Garden of Eden.  These “what if” ideologues need to be reminded that wealth 
and industrial progress are associated with better, not worse health.  Blanket applications 
of the precautionary principle ultimately would mean rejecting the modern technologies 
that have given us our enviable state of good health and longevity, and the freedom to 
enjoy it.” 
 
Elizabeth M. Whelan, Can too much safety be hazardous?  A critical look at the “precautionary principle,” 
AMERICAN COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND HEALTH EDITORIAL (May 23, 2000).  See also THOMAS R. 
DEGREGORI, BOUNTIFUL HARVEST: TECHNOLOGY, FOOD SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT __ (2002) 
(“The precautionary principle is often defined as the view that ‘absence of evidence is not the same as 
absence of risk.’  What this really says is that the proponents of the principle have lost the argument on the 
evidence (otherwise they would argue the evidence), so they argue that we should follow their policy 
prescriptions anyway.  Stated differently: if our fears and phobias are right, we are right, but even if we are 
wrong, well, we are still right.  It's ‘my policy, right or wrong.’”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: 
SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2002) (arguing that government agencies should predicate 
regulatory decisions and prioritize expenditures on the basis of sound risk assessments); BJORN LOMBORG, 
THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE OF THE WORLD (2001) (arguing for 
evidence-based prioritization of resources toward “real” problems rather than nomological possibilities for 
global warming); Gary E. Marchant, From General Policy to Legal Rule: Aspirations and Limitations of 
the Precautionary Principle, 111 ENVIRON. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 1799, 1801 (2003) (“The ambiguity of 
the [Precautionary Principle] invites arbitrary application, both with respect to which risks it is applied to 
and what it requires when it does apply.”); John D. Graham & Susan Hsia, Europe’s precautionary 
principle: promise and pitfalls, 5 J. RISK RESEARCH 371, 371 (2002) (finding European Community's broad 
regulatory adoption of Precautionary Principle unsatisfactory and concluding that “[c]ritical terms need to 
be defined, the evidentiary hurdles for precaution need to be clarified, and checks and balances against ill-
considered application of the principle need to be strengthened.  A systematic process of ranking hazards 
and targeting cost-effective protection opportunities should be implemented by the EC as a counterweight 
to enactment of precautionary measures on a crisis-by-crisis basis.”). 
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liability.71  Because plaintiffs have a burden of proof to establish causality, only risks (known 
causal possibilities) are relevant; the fact that a regulatory agency issued sanctions or took 
“preventative” action against uncertainties because it is compelled to by law does not demonstrate 
an established causal contribution (or lack thereof).72 
 
To summarize the first major contribution of Kiodynamic Theory: A properly identified 
risk is (1) an epistemic causal possibility (2) expressed as a quantified probability/likelihood (3) 
that results in a harm/injury.  Kiodynamic Theory asserts that all other would-be “risk” 
propositions are either uncertainties or impossibilities, and cannot serve as a basis for liability. 
 
IV.  PROXIMATE RISK AND NEGLIGENCE 
 
Someone creates a risk.  Someone is injured.  Does the victim recover? Not 
automatically.  A negligence-based tort requires more than the mere creation of risk and injury.  
But exactly which elements should factor into a finding of negligence (and thus, liability) has 
resulted in intense debate without good resolution. 
                                                
71 In his struggle to address the arbitrariness of the Precautionary Principle’s application, Gary Marchant 
has indirectly suggested a more refined set of classes of possibility than those we described in Figure 4.  
Gary E. Marchant, From General Policy to Legal Rule: Aspirations and Limitations of the Precautionary 
Principle, 111 ENVIRON. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 1799 (2003).  By extension of Marchant’s reasoning, 
nomological possibilities that are not yet epistemic consist of two subclasses: (1) those that have arisen in 
some individuals’ imagination but remain empirically controverted (“uncertain” possibilities), and (2) 
those that have not yet even been dreamt up (“ignorance”).  This bifurcation could possibly offer 
desirable objectivity in application of the Precautionary Principle.  If this standard applied, the 
Precautionary Principle would justify regulation of uncertain possible dangers but not for regulation of 
nomological possibilities for which society is purely ignorant. See id. at 1800 (“It is difficult to see how 
the [Precautionary Principle] can help address risks for which we are ignorant rather than uncertain.”).  
However, Marchant’s division between ignorance and uncertainty is not relevant to judicial regulation 
(tort or criminal law), where the dividing line for liability rests between risk and uncertainty.  See note __ 
(next note), infra. 
72 See Philip S. Guzelian & Christopher P. Guzelian, Authority-Based Explanation, 303 SCIENCE 1468, 
1469 (2004) (“It may be prudent for preventative purposes to act as if some chemicals present health 
risks, but such decisions should never be confused with evidence-based conclusions that such agents do 
cause harm.”).  And as Judge Richard Posner has said, “[l]aw lags science; it does not lead it.”  Rosen v. 
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996). See also Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 727-28 (Tex. 1997) (“Courts should not embrace inferences that good science 
would not draw. …[T]he law should not be hasty to impose liability when scientifically reliable evidence 
is unavailable.”); Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 19 F. Supp.2d 592, 606 (S.D. W.Va. 1998) (“[T]he Court 
cannot abdicate its role as ‘gatekeeper’ and subject the jury unfairly to confusing and misleading 
‘pseudoscientific’ research.”); Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts 
Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY & LAW 327 (2001) (advocating 
expanded use of evidence-based approach to separate uncertainties from epistemic possibilities). 
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Unlike regulatory agencies,73 American courts have never systematically prioritized tort 
claims.  As has been observed in regulatory contexts,74 without risk prioritization, coherent risk 
deterrence does not occur.   Accordingly, many Kiodynamic theorists contend that negligence 
must involve systematic risk prioritization.75 
                                                
73 See e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, Reducing Risks: Setting Priorities and Strategies for 
Environmental Protection, SAB-EC-90-021 (Washington, DC, 1990), p.6 (encouraging EPA to “target 
its environmental protection efforts on the basis of opportunities for the greatest risk reduction.”). @more 
cites 
74 Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L.REV. 21, 50-51 
(2001) (“ Many commentators believe that lack of appropriate risk analysis and comparative risk 
prioritization represents the greatest obstacle to achieving sound environmental regulation.  They argue, 
with considerable justification, that without a sustained effort to measure and compare risks, 
environmental regulation is little more than shooting in the dark.”). @more cites – Breyer, Sunstein. 
75 Courts rarely bother to quantify risks (some even expressly refuse to).  See e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard 
PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 788 (3rd Cir. 1994) (“Paoli II”) (“Nor do we think that an expert must quantify the 
increased risk.”); Merry v. Westinghouse Elect. Corp., 684 F.Supp. 847, 850 (M.D.Pa. 1988) (criticizing a 
quantification of risk requirement because “[w]e think this formulation unduly impedes the ability of courts 
to recognize that medical science may necessarily and properly intervene where there is a significant but 
unquantified risk of serious disease.”).  They rely instead on quantitative adjectives such as “substantial,” 
“inconsequential,” “trivial,” or “significant” to delimit which risks are judicially redressable.  Such 
modifiers, absent supporting quantification, are notoriously imprecise.  They encourage both subjectivity 
and error; they defeat any effort to sensibly risk prioritize.  As this author has written elsewhere: 
 
“Quantitative adjectives lack precision and accuracy.  Descriptors such as ‘significant,’ 
… ‘serious,’ ‘large,’ ‘small,’ ‘trivial,’ ‘meaningful,’ ‘substantial,’ ‘inconsequential,’ and 
so forth are simply ineffective standards for classifying risk magnitudes unless backed by 
actual quantification.  Say we wish to discuss a particular level of risk.  What level of risk 
is ‘significant’?  …   
The correct answer [] is ‘it depends.’  Quantitative adjectives only gain meaning 
in a context.  Is a quantitative adjectival ‘bright line’ getting at a proportionate risk 
increase (‘[A] relative risk of 1.0 means that the agent has no effect on the incidence of 
disease.… [A] relative risk of 2.0 implies a 50% likelihood that an exposed individual's 
disease was caused by the agent.’), an aggregate level of risk (‘[a]sbestosis 
sufferers….have a significant (one in ten) risk of dying of mesothelioma…’), or both 
(‘because of plaintiff's exposure to benzidine, his risk of developing bladder cancer had 
increased from one in ten thousand to one in ten’)?  In determining whether medical 
screening is advisable, for instance, physicians focus only on aggregate risk; diagnostic 
decisions don’t turn on the source of risk, just that a threshold has been transgressed.  
However, … fair apportionment of [] liability … requires both aggregate and relative risk 
considerations.” 
 
Christopher P. Guzelian, Liability & Fear, 65 OHIO STATE L.J. 713, __ (2004).  See also Christopher P. 
Guzelian et al., A Quantitative Methodology for Determining the Need For Exposure-Prompted Medical 
Monitoring, 79 IND. L.J. 57, 62 (2004) (“Judicial use of quantitative adjectives as a proxy for assessing the 
actual increase in risk is a questionable practice.  One pair of authors observes that ‘the court[s] self-
consciously rel[y] on a series of quantitative modifiers…in an effort to reserve liability for truly deserving 
cases.  Anyone familiar with modern American trial practice will understand that, however well meaning, 
this reliance on superlatives will not prevent most well-prepared cases from reaching triers of fact.’”), 
quoting James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad:  Exposure-Based 
Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV. 815, 845 (2002).  
JOHN C. CHICKEN & TAMIL POSNER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RISK 11 (1998) (“any precise discussion of the 
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One problem, of course, with an explicit move to a risk prioritized tort system – in which 
certain injury-resulting risks would not be judicially cognizable because they occur too 
infrequently to merit judicial attention – is that courts are tasked (likely as a constitutional 
requirement) with dispensing individual justice injury-by-injury.  Yet the practical reality is that 
there is nothing superhuman about the judicial branch.  It is constrained by finite budgets, time, 
expertise, and staff (more so even than regulatory agencies comprised of expert risk analysts).76  
Even while paying lip service to the adage that “every man must have his day in court,” tort law 
faces the reality that if every alleged negligence-and-resulting-injury claim really had its day in 
court, the system will buckle.   
 To maintain an illusion of individual justice, the current tort system has fashioned an 
unprincipled haphazard set of rules to limit the number of cognizable injuries.77  Take a specific 
example: a person within the “zone of danger” who witnesses his daughter struck and killed by an 
automobile has an actionable claim (emotional distress).  But a plaintiff who witnesses his fiancée 
struck and killed in identical circumstances cannot recover in some jurisdictions.  This is not 
because the fiancé’s emotional distress is scientifically believed any less injurious and terrible 
than the father’s.  Rather, it is because courts have set up a veiled, illogical patchwork of 
prioritization rules that quietly eliminate certain classes of injuries, which in a world of unlimited 
judicial resources might well be actionable.  This patchwork prevents administrative overload of 
the courts, while maintaining the false public belief that individual justice is being done.78  
Class action suits and the rise of so-called “Enterprise Liability” theory are recent 
theoretical attempts to improve individual justice.  Still, the take-home lesson is that the judicial 
inability to ensure individual justice, regardless of how much one cherishes that goal, is an 
inherent aspect of any constrained judicial system where claims outstrip resources.  
                                                                                                                                            
acceptability of a risk must describe the risk in quantitative terms; if the risk is described only in soft, 
qualitative terms, any conclusions about its acceptability will be equally soft or, to put it another way, will 
be merely uncertain speculation.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 111 (2002) (suggesting that accounting for both quantitative and qualitative aspects of risk 
is necessary for adequate risk assessment). 
76 See Council of Economic Advisers, Who Pays for Tort Liability Claims?  An Economic Analysis of the 
U.S. Tort Liability System (April 2002). 
77 For a related idea, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984) (contending that selective transmission to the public of 
rules governing decisionmakers’ adjudications is a questionable practice). 
78 See Christopher P. Guzelian, Liability & Fear, 65 OHIO STATE L.J. 713, § __ (2004) (describing non-
sensibility of fear and emotional distress tort liability rules and proposing rules to sensibly prioritize 
emotional harm claims). 
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As we show in the following sections IV(A) and (B), some Kiodynamists contend that 
within this administratively limited system of justice, better risk prioritization should, must, and 
can be attained in tort law. 
 
IV(A).  “SIGNIFICANT” RISK 
Case-by-case regulation is an inefficient and possibly disadvantageous means for risk 
deterrence.79  Nonetheless, common law tort is ingrained in American culture. Abandoning it in 
favor of an administrative regime designed for risk prioritization probably will not happen.  But 
common law can still be tilted toward individual case adjudication that is based on orderly risk 
prioritization.  For any regulatory system, Kiodynamic Theory favors infusing whatever amount 
of evidence-based risk prioritization is possible.  It therefore expects courts to systematically 
decide whether a risk is “significant.”80  Assessing whether a risk is “significant” proceeds 
according to a basic risk priority rule (which we state first and then examine in detail immediately 
below): 
 
A Kiodynamically “Significant” Risk 
The more an at-risk (and injured) plaintiff can establish that the risk he suffers is: 
(1) one that results in judicially cognizable injury more frequently relative to 
other risks (“injurious” risk); and  
(2) one for which comparatively more people or property are at similar risk 
relative to other risks (“widespread” risk), 
the greater should be the plaintiff’s priority among would-be claimants for 
recovery.81 
 
                                                
79 As one academic states: 
 
“[J]udicial review may make problems of fragmentation and lack of consistency worse by 
overlaying extensive legal procedures and case-by-case litigation on an already unwieldy 
and fragmented legal and institutional apparatus.  This overlay of procedural formality 
and litigation makes many aspects of the U.S. environmental regulatory system more 
costly and burdensome than the similar command-and-control systems of other advanced 
industrialized countries that achieve equivalent levels of environmental protection.” 
 
Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L.REV. 21, 38 (2001). 
80 As we will see in Section V, a risk must be “significant,” according to Kiodynamic Theory, if 
the claim of “negligence” hinging upon that risk is to be cognizable.  Furthermore, even if a risk 
is “significant,” it must also be net costly to lead to liability.  See Section IV(b), infra. 
81 For fear or emotional distress liability assignments, an additional assumption that a Kiodynamic-minded 
jurist must make is to assert that the person placed at physical risk perceives that risk.  For additional 
details about this requisite supposition and the unique techniques necessary for addressing psychic injury 
claims, see Christopher P. Guzelian, Liability & Fear, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 713 (2004). 
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IV(A)(I). THE INJURIOUS RISK THRESHOLD 
 
The first step Kiodynamic Theory takes to risk prioritize is to limit court access to those 
plaintiffs’ whose defendant-caused82 risks are more likely to be injurious (i.e. result in the 
predicted injury) than other risks.  Evidence-Based Logic can usually nail down what percent of 
people, at similar risk as the plaintiff,83 do, in fact, sustain injury.  Thus, Kiodynamic Theory 
envisions establishing an injurious risk cut-off for each risk.  Risks whose likelihoods of resulting 
in harm fall below this threshold are generally not cognizable; risks whose likelihoods surpass the 
threshold generally are.84 
There is a considerable problem with this rationale, however, which Kiodynamic Theory 
acknowledges:  it is anything but clear at what level the injurious risk cut-off should be set.  
Indeed, some natural rights philosophers reject any non-zero injurious risk threshold, as 
philosopher Robert Nozick once explained: 
 
[W]hat is the magnitude of the specified [injurious risk] value?  The harm of the least 
significant act (yielding only that harm for certain) that violates a person’s natural rights?  
This construal of the problem cannot be utilized by a tradition which holds that stealing a 
penny or a pin or anything from someone violates his rights.  That tradition does not 
select a threshold measure of harms as a lower limit, in the case of harms certain to occur.  
It is difficult to imagine a principled way in which the natural-rights tradition can draw 
the line to fix which probabilities impose unacceptably great risks upon others.  This 
means that it is difficult to see how, in these cases, the natural-rights tradition draws the 
boundaries [a threshold] focuses upon.85 
 
                                                
82 The cumulative risk of a specific injury to a particular person usually results from an aggregation of acts 
and circumstances, not just from one tortfeasor’s act. For instance, the cumulative risk of contracting 
leukemia from benzene exposure almost invariably presupposes that there are multiple agents contributing 
as sources of that benzene exposure – the dry-cleaning shop around the corner, the large textile factory 
across town, and exposure to background benzene residues – both natural and man-made.  See Christopher 
P. Guzelian et al., A Quantitative Methodology for Determining the Need For Exposure-Prompted Medical 
Monitoring, 79 IND. L.J. 57, 91-92 (2004) (indicating that a risk is the sum of the plaintiff’s contribution 
plus the pre-exposure incidence), citing David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure 
Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 855-56 (1984).  In setting the 
injurious risk threshold, Kiodynamic Theory focuses exclusively on the creation of or augmentation in risk 
resulting from a defendant’s acts.  It does not concern itself with cumulative risk. 
83 See Christopher P. Guzelian, Kiodynamic Delimiters, forthcoming (2005) (showing the method by 
which one can objectively determine what scientific evidence of risk applies to individuals “similarly 
situated” to a particular plaintiff). 
84 There are at least three reasons for deviation from this general principle:  (1) the amount of disutility a 
particular risk’s effect causes, on average, in injured victims (see immediately below in this section); (2) 
how widespread the risk created by the individual defendant is (See Section IV(A)(ii), infra); (3) 
economic considerations (See Section IV(B), infra). 
85 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 75 (1974). 
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Thus, inherent philosophical tension between judicial pragmatism (explained at the outset 
of this section) and this natural rights critique makes it difficult to set a particular “injuriousness” 
level or range, and even less obvious on what basis to do so.  To complicate matters further, the 
disutility of a particular injury may influence the particular injury cut-off.  For instance, if the 
injurious risk cut-off is 5% for contracting cancer, is the acceptable cut-off higher (e.g. 15%) for a 
less grievous harm (e.g. destroying another’s property)? 
As the Supreme Court itself has come close to acknowledging, society can only 
arbitrarily delineate which risks to address and which to ignore.86  Judges have to decide what 
quantified aggregate level of risk for a specific harm they are philosophically uncomfortable with 
permitting, and set the corresponding quantified injurious risk cut-off.87  What Kiodynamic 
Theory can offer is transparency: when judges select a particular quantified injurious cut-off (or 
range), they should be explicit in stating that level.  As a result, the tenor and quality of policy 
debate as to whether that cutoff is appropriate will vastly improve. 
 
IV(A)(II) WIDESPREAD RISKS 
There is another reason the “injurious risk cutoff” is difficult to identify in practice: it is a 
benchmark that is not necessarily the same as the cut-off actually set in any courtroom. For 
instance, might we allow an actor to engage in certain behaviors whose likelihood of causing risk 
exceeds the risk threshold (e.g. the threshold is 10%, the defendant’s act causes 11% chance of 
harm)?  Conversely, would we ever want to hold a specific defendant liable even if the risk of 
physical harm he has created does not meet the risk floor (e.g., the cut-off is 10%, the defendant’s 
act causes an 8% risk of harm)? 
Under Kiodynamic Theory, establishing the “significance” of a risk in the context of 
establishing individual liability incorporates considerations beyond those that factor into setting 
the injurious risk cut-off.  One cause for deviation from the injurious risk threshold is the number 
                                                
86 See Indus. Union Dep't v. API, 448 U.S. 607, 655 n.62 (1980) (“[W]hile [a regulatory agency] must 
support its finding that a certain level of risk exists by substantial evidence, we recognize that its 
determination that a particular level of risk is ‘significant’ will be based largely on policy considerations.  
At this point we have no need to reach the issue of what level of scrutiny a reviewing court should apply 
to the latter type of determination.”). Accord NOZICK, at 75. (“One might plausibly argue that beginning 
with probabilities that may vary continuously and asking that some line be drawn misconstrues the 
problem and almost guarantees that any position of the line (other than 0 or 1) will appear arbitrary.”). 
87 See, e.g., Temple-Island Products Corp. v. Carter, 993 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. 1999) (rejecting fear of 
asbestos-related illness claim of asymptomatic plaintiff, even upon accepting testimony of expert “that 
the chances of [plaintiff’s] developing a disease as a result had increased from one in a million, which he 
estimated to be the risk that a person would ever develop a disease from asbestos exposure not 
occupationally related, to about one in 500,000 for the next ten or fifteen years, and as much as one in 
100 over twenty or thirty years.”).  
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of people or amount of property a tortfeasor has placed at risk.88  Say, for instance, that tortfeasor 
A by his careless actions has placed 100 people at risk of cancer, and that the fashion in which he 
did is known by EBL to cause 11% of the same to contract cancer, where the injurious risk cut-
off is set at 10%.  Assume tortfeasor B has negligently placed 100 million people at risk of 
cancer, and that EBL predicts 9% will contract cancer.  On average, A should cause 11 people to 
suffer the harm, but B will cause 9 million people to suffer the same.  Should A be liable while B 
is not?89   
Following the current logic of many regulatory agencies,90 the Kiodynamic answer is 
typically “no.”  Applying an aggregate cut-off equally to all physical injurers would enable a 
behemoth injurer to escape liability simply because he doesn’t meet the one-size-fits-all 
percentage threshold.  Kiodynamic thinkers find this judicial practice ill-advised.  An individual 
threshold (or range) must be constructed along a sliding scale based on how many individuals a 
physical injurer puts at risk, with the threshold serving only as the initial benchmark.  This 
Kiodynamic concept is motivated by antitrust law, where some actions regarded as lawfully 
“competitive” by companies with little market power (analogous to tortfeasors who put few 
people or little property at risk) are unlawfully “monopolistic” when undertaken by larger 
competitors (analogous to tortfeasors who put many people or much property at risk).91 
Cut-offs set for individual defendants can deviate in practice, sometimes substantially, 
from the theoretical injurious risk threshold.  Kiodynamic Theory requires judges, however, to 
first derive that cut-off, and then determine whether individual defendants’ circumstances merit 
upward or downward departure.  Only by this method can one separate the distinct considerations 
that go into establishing the aggregate and individual “significances” of a risk. 
                                                
88 There are at least two other reasons to deviate from the theoretical threshold.  See note __ (in IV(A)(i)), 
supra. 
89 Assume that the cost-benefit ratios, scaled accordingly for the magnitude of each injurer’s act, are 
identical. 
90 Curtis C. Travis et al., Cancer risk management: A review of 132 federal regulatory decisions, 21 
ENVT’L SCIENCE & TECH. 415, 419 (1987) (finding an inverse relationship between the EPA and other 
regulatory agencies’ injurious risk thresholds and the sizes of the at-risk populations). 
91 Areeda and Hovenkamp, for example, define market power as “the ability to raise price by restricting 
output.” See generally PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, IIA ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION §5A (2nd ed. 2002).  By analogy, a 
tortfeasor with “risk power” has the resources and means to put many people in a society at risk by his 
act(s).  Kiodynamic Theory thus far has accommodated all philosophical camps in assessing what the 
correct size of “society” is in considering the scope of a risk.  Some contend that local risk regulation is 
more effective. RICHARD A. MINARD, JR., COMPARATIVE RISK AND THE STATES (Resources for the 
Future, 1996).  Others believe only a national (or international) integrated approach can adequately 
address risk. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 508-517 (Peter S. Menell & Richard B. Stewart eds., 
1994).  An answer to this debate may have to be borne out empirically over time. 
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IV(B)   EXCUSING “SIGNIFICANT” RISKS: DECISION ANALYSIS 
 
Even if a defendant’s act creates an individually “significant” risk, he sometimes will be 
excused from liability because of cost-benefit considerations.  Robert Nozick explained: 
 
[I]t might be decided that mining or running trains is sufficiently valuable to be allowed, 
even though each presents risks to the passerby no less than compulsory Russian roulette 
with one bullet and n chambers (with n set appropriately), which is prohibited because it 
is not sufficiently valuable.  There are problems in mak[ing] these decisions.… The 
problems could lessen if the overall states (totality below the threshold, and so on) can be 
reached by the operation of some invisible-hand mechanism.  But the precise mechanism 
to accomplish this has yet to be described…92 
 
Learned Hand long ago popularized a rudimentary cost-benefit test.93  A persistent 
criticism of Hand’s test (which Nozick recognized when he said that no “precise” mechanism for 
such analysis exists) is its denomination of physical harms and economic/property harms on a 
single monetized scale.94  Kiodynamic Theory mandates use of “decision analysis,” which 
avoids the problems of Hand’s test,95 but still appropriately exonerates certain physical injurers 
from liability, even for some injurers who have created “significant” risks to certain individuals. 
                                                
92 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 74 (1974). 
93 See United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947) (holding that the risk of a defendant’s 
conduct is calculated as a combination of (i) the magnitude of damage that might occur; (ii) the 
probability that a certain magnitude of damage will occur).   
94 See e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Negligence, 16 SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY & POLICY 2, 52, 80 (1999) (objecting 
that monetization of physical risks turns “moral analysis into a bloodless form of calculation,” but noting 
that such “qualitative” balancing as described would avoid this problem); Gregory C. Keating, 
Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 342 (1996) (“[I]t is neither 
natural nor necessary to conceptualize accident and precaution costs in economic terms.”). 
95 Decision analysis allows quantification of estimated risk “losses” in terms of risk.  It is simultaneously 
capable of itemizing estimated monetary values for economic losses.  But it doesn’t require that the analyst 
reduce risks and property harms to a singular monetary scale, as Hand’s formula necessarily must.  In this 
fashion, decision analysis can contribute to unprecedented judicial consistency and accuracy in gauging 
negligence without sacrificing reflection on the “moral” nature of many injuries.  Cf. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 
349 F.3d 1191, *27-28 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding without conducting quantified decision analysis that 
handgun manufacturers’ distribution of guns to police departments, which ostensibly allows for easier 
criminal access to used guns, “is outweighed by the health and safety interests of potential victims of gun 
violence at the hands of prohibited purchasers”); Joseph L. Arvai et al., Testing a Structured Decision 
Approach: Value-Focused Thinking for Deliberative Risk Communication, 21 RISK ANALYSIS 1065 (2001) 
(finding that focus group use of “value-focused thinking” – a crude and sometimes non-quantitative form of 
decision analysis can help to improve public perceptions of risk). 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art16
 31 
Decision analysis is best understood through case examples,96 but its conceptual thrust is 
that it is a robust,97 evidence-based, and widely accepted methodology used to determine whether 
leaving an act unaltered is relatively less socially costly than modifying the act so as to mitigate 
some or all of the act’s associated “significant” risks.  Stated formally, a defendant has no liability 
if the expected net social cost98 after any feasible modification to his act is higher than the 
expected net social cost of leaving the act unchanged.  (Conversely, if some viable modification 
would have made the act less costly, the actor is liable.)  Purely for simplicity, we will consider 
only an act’s costs, not its benefits.99  This simplifying assumption means that individual liability 
exists wherever the modified act’s expected total social cost is less than the unaltered act’s 
expected total social cost.100 
                                                
96 See generally DETLOF VON WINTERFELDT & WARD EDWARDS, DECISION ANALYSIS AND BEHAVIORAL 
RESEARCH (1986); RONALD A. HOWARD & JAMES MATHESON (EDS.), THE PRINCIPLES AND 
APPLICATIONS OF DECISION ANALYSIS (1983); Jerome P. Kassirer et al., Decision Analysis: A Progress 
Report, 106 ANNALS INT. MED. 275 (1987); Stephen G. Pauker & Jerome Kassirer, Decision analysis, 
316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 250 (1987); H.C. Sox, Decision Analysis:  A Basic Clinical Skill?, 316 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 271 (1987); Ronald A. Howard, J.E. Matheson, D.W. North, The decision to seed hurricanes, 
176 SCIENCE 1191 (1972). 
97 Stephen G. Pauker, Deciding about screening, 118 ANNALS INT. MED. 901 (1993) (“A formal decision 
analysis can help structure the problem, organize data, elucidate tradeoffs, and estimate benefits and 
costs.”).  Decision analysis has been shown in medicine to be a particularly helpful alternative to 
conducting costly and time-consuming controlled clinical trials when a physician wishes to assess 
whether a proposed medical intervention is more likely to be of benefit than of harm to patients.  See 
Peter Doubilet & Barbara J. McNeil, Clinical Decision Making, 23 MEDICAL CARE 648, 648 (1985) 
(“Decision analysis is most applicable to clinical questions that cannot be answered by appealing directly 
to the results of clinical trial or to a large database.  They can occur because no trial has been carried out 
or because the patient in question differs substantially from the populations in existing sources of data.”).  
As such, decision analysis’s predictive power is directly translatable to determining negligence.  It could 
be used to predict whether modification or elimination of an act that has caused harm is socially 
preferable to the alternative of allowing the act to proceed unchanged. 
98 “Net social cost” is measured by subtracting “total social costs” (the social disutility suffered from a 
defendant’s act, see note __, infra) from “total social benefits” (the social utility gained from a 
defendant’s act).  A person causing a significant risk is negligent whenever a modification could have 
been made to the underlying act that would have resulted in a relative decrease in net social cost. Thus, it 
is theoretically possible that the “net social cost” is positive (i.e. a net social benefit), yet a person is still 
negligent. 
99 This assumption obviously need not be true in reality.  A modification or elimination of an act could 
have disparate impacts on social benefits and social costs associated with it.   Decision analysis is fully 
capable of addressing both.  Dobbs explains well why one makes this assumption: “The usefulness or 
[benefit] of conduct actually includes the costs saved by not adopting some other course of conduct, but 
it is sometimes clearer if [benefit] and cost of greater safety are stated separately.”  DAN B. DOBBS, 
TORTS § 144, 338 n.5. 
100 A “total social cost” is derived for both the unaltered act and each proposed modification of that act. 
The “total social cost” associated with the unmodified act (“TCact”) is a vector of all “n” significant risks 
(“Ri”) along with a vector of all “m” property damages, (“Pj”): 
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An act’s total social cost can actually increase when one tries to reduce a particular risk.  
This is because of “risk covariance”: eliminating the “significance” of one risk can make another 
“significant.”101  For example, designing a street-corner lamp pole to collapse easily in a 
vehicular collision decreases the risk of injury to drivers, but the modification may 
simultaneously convert a previously insignificant risk of injury to nearby pedestrians into one that 
is significant.102  Modifications, however, do not always cause other risks to become significant.  
Bailing water out of a flooded lifeboat into the ocean substantially reduces the risk of drowning, 
but does not increase the risk of coastal flooding.103 
Decision analysis, in sum, promises to elucidate tradeoffs and offers effective risk 
minimization and avoidance without suffering the sustained criticisms that cost-benefit 
computations that set all losses in economic terms do. 
 
V. KIODYNAMIC DEFINITIONS: PROXIMATE RISK, NEGLIGENCE, DUTY 
                                                                                                                                            
! 
TCact = Ri + Pj , i " {1,...,n}, j " {1,...,m} 
 
Assuming only for notational simplicity that the defendant would suffer no transactional (out-of-
pocket) financial costs by being forced to modify his act, the “total social cost” (“TCmod”) of each proposed 
and EBL-justified modification of the act is expressed similar to the unmodified total social cost equation 
above, but the number and magnitudes of some or all of the associated “significant” risks must be assessed 
for each modification and are not necessarily the same across modifications.  Thus, proposed modification 
#1 might have s “significant” risks associated with it, and t property costs, and so on for every other 
possible modification.  (The vector sizes of the modifications may or may not be equal to the vector sizes 
of the unmodified act.  There is no way of universalizing how a modification will affect the number of 
significant risks, or the number of different property damages.)  The final EBL-known modification, the zth 
possible modification, has u “significant” risks associated with it, and v property costs: 
 
  
! 
TCmod1 = Rk + Pl , k " {1,...,s}, l " {1,...,t}
M
TCmod z = Ra + Pb , a " {1,...,u}, b " {1,...,v}
 
Observe from this process that it is still possible to reduce the expected utilities of a risk to a 
common scale, as Hand did.  The power of decision analysis is that that computation is not required; one 
has the ability to tabulate risks in risk-terms, rather than to monetize them. 
101 See generally JOHN D. GRAHAM, JONATHAN B. WIENER, CASS R. SUNSTEIN (EDS.), RISK VERSUS RISK: 
TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1997) (contending that risk covariance is 
ubiquitous). 
102 Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., 403 N.E.2d 391 (Mass. 1980) (concluding that pedestrian risk of injury 
became too significant and hence defendant was negligent for designing breakaway pole to protect 
drivers).  
103 See Indiana Consolidated Ins. Co. v. Matthew, 402 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (finding no 
negligence where defendant immediately fled plaintiff’s garage after mower caught fire instead of 
pushing mower outside first, because the expected risk of harm to the garage was less than the expected 
risk of injury tending to a potentially explosive mower marginally longer). 
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Kiodynamic Theory, based on the principles set out in the previous sections, can offer 
rigorous definitions of proximate cause, negligence (breach), and duty that have been lacking so 
greatly.104  The reader will observe that these Kiodynamic definitions are quite formal, as they 
must be when incorporating the precise concepts of risk and a risk’s “significance” discussed in 
Sections III and IV. 
 
 
 
 
 
The definition is a mouthful, but if we break it down into its three enumerated parts, it is 
sensible. 
(i) Risk.  Proximate cause is a kind of risk, verified as an epistemic possibility by EBL 
(see Section III, supra).  Proximate cause is also a form of negligence (which, we will see in the 
next definition below, is a set of risks).105  Negligence exists even if there is only exactly one 
risk that meets its definitional conditions.  Not coincidentally, that is also the definition of a 
proximate cause, which can therefore be thought of as the “weakest” form of negligence.106   
                                                
104 Kiodynamic definitions are partly motivated by Ludwig Träger’s “most clairvoyant person” rule.  See 
LUDWIG TRÄGER, DER KAUSALBEGRIFF IM STRAF- UND ZIVILRECHT (1904).  This author has discussed 
this rule elsewhere in detail.  See Christopher P. Guzelian, Liability & Fear, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 713 § 
III(D) (2004).  Under the Kiodynamic adaptation of Träger’s rule, liability should attach if the risk (a) is 
recognizable under EBL at the time the event occurred; and (b) taking into account any additional 
knowledge the alleged tortfeasor has.  Condition (b) is not usually applicable, but may have relevance 
for, say, individuals with classified or secret information. 
105 Dobbs suggests that proximate cause – “a rule limiting liability for risk to the scope of the risk” – is 
properly viewed “as a corollary to or even a part of the basic rule of negligence.”  DOBBS, § 182 at 446. 
In fact, the rigorous Kiodynamic definition permits us to go one better: proximate cause is always a kind 
of negligence. 
106 Notice, however, the implicit prerequisite to proximate cause that is not imposed on negligence 
generally: for proximate cause to exist, not only must it be the case that it is generally “possible” for the 
particular risk of harm to cause injury, it must have done so in the particular instance.  That is, the legal 
issue of “specific scientific causality” (“specific cause in fact”) must be resolved before proximate cause 
can be. 
Proximate Cause (“Proximate risk”).  A proximate risk is (i) a risk associated with an act 
that should have been mitigated at the time the act occurred because (ii) the risk is 
“significant” and (iii) the net social cost, if the act had been modified so as to counteract this 
particular risk, would have been less than the unaltered act’s net social cost. 
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Furthermore, beware: proximate cause (or negligence in general) is not an act (a human-
prompted stimulus).  It is a risk associated with an act.107  Courts and scholars, beginning with 
then-Judge Cardozo,108 have often made this mistake.109  The distinction may seem semantics, 
inasmuch as an act must occur for a risk to exist.  Yet it is necessary because examining the “act” 
usually regresses to considering only the defendant’s conduct.  This deprives scrutiny of the 
context in which that act occurred and jeopardizes rigorous assessment of whether the risk 
associated with the act is both epistemic and “significant.”110  Although then-Judge Cardozo 
himself made this mistake in Palsgraf, he was on the right track when he distinguished speedy 
drivers on a racetrack and those on a crowded public street.111 
(ii & iii)  “Significant” Risk & Decision Analysis (Cost-Benefit Analysis).  For a risk 
associated with an act to also be a proximate cause, it must be both “significant” and inexcusable 
by decision analysis.  The aim of these requirements, consistent with the “significant risk” 
principle set out in the introduction to Section IV (see page __, supra), is to prioritize risk 
deterrence and address the most socially costly, inexcusable risks first. 
 
                                                
107 True, a person cannot have created or perpetuated a risk without committing an act or omission.  But 
this is not the same as saying the act is the proximate cause (or negligence).  Even if zebras were the only 
creatures with stripes, this does not mean a zebra is a stripe. 
108 See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100 (“[O]ne who drives at reckless speed through a crowded city street is 
guilty of a negligent act and, therefore, of a wrongful one irrespective of the consequences.  Negligent 
the act is, and wrongful in the sense that it is unsocial. … If the same act were to be committed on a 
speedway or a race course, it would lose its wrongful quality.  The risk reasonably to be perceived 
defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation…”). 
109 Hernandez v. Trawler Miss Vertie Mae, Inc., 187 F.3d 432, 437 (4th Cir. 1999) (“It is well understood 
that negligence is “conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others 
against unreasonable risk of harm.”) (emphasis added), quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
282 at 9; Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 544 (N.J. 1982) (“negligence is 
conduct-oriented, asking whether defendant's actions were reasonable…”). 
110 See Philip S. Guzelian et al., Evidence-Based Toxicology, 24 HUMAN & EXPERIMENTAL TOXICOLOGY 
__ (in press, 2005) (discussing how to form necessary “delimiters” so that risk propositions are properly 
stated). 
111 Judges sometimes create categorical duty “rules,” such that an act is presumptively wrongful, no 
matter what its context. In the limit, these rules blur negligence with strict liability.  For instance, dynamite 
blasting is categorized as an “ultrahazardous” activity – harms resulting from it are presumptively 
recoverable.  See Garden of The Gods Village, Inc. v. Hellman, 294 P.2d 597, 600 (Co. 1956) (“Where 
damage to property is done by vibration or concussion from blasting operations there is liability 
irrespective of negligence.  Proof of negligence is unnecessary to establish liability.”).  See also Palsgraf, 
162 N.E. at 100 (Cardozo, J.) (“Some acts, such as shooting, are so imminently dangerous to any one who 
may come within reach of the missile, however unexpectedly, as to impose a duty of prevision not far from 
that of an insurer.”).  This author has misgivings about the widespread invocation of categorical duty rules, 
particularly in the context of fear, but that topic is beyond the scope of this article. 
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We make two other observations about proximate causes.  First, a plaintiff must identify 
the proximate cause.  Proximate causes are therefore always litigated risks.  Second, litigators and 
judges should use the expression, “proximate risk,” rather than the misnomer “proximate cause,” 
to avoid continued confusion with scientific causation – both in its general and specific forms.112  
We will do so ourselves henceforth. 
 
 
 
  
Negligence is a particular kind of set of risks (“negligent risks”) associated with an 
act.113    For negligence to exist, at least one risk must be “significant,” and an aggregate 
decision analysis (see Section IV(B), supra) must show that leaving the act unaltered has a 
greater total social cost than eliminating or abating some or all “significant” risks.114 
The traditional judicial concept of negligence says that an individual is still “negligent,” 
even if the negligent risks associated with his conduct are not the ones being litigated.115  Thus, a 
defendant could be negligent, but be exonerated from liability because he has not created a 
proximate risk (which is the litigated risk). 
                                                
112 See note __ (Dobbs), supra. 
113 Some acts or omissions may have no known negligent risks associated with them at a given time.  
Understand, however, it is never permissible to pronounce such acts as “definitively” non-negligent.  
Because risk knowledge is a product of time and humanity’s collective understanding, risks that are not 
epistemically possible today may become so tomorrow. 
114 Aggregate decision analysis proceeds much the same as decision analysis would for proximate risk.  
The only change is that aggregate decision analysis considers whether act modification to avoid any set 
of significant risks (not necessarily the litigated risk(s)) would be net socially beneficial. 
115 Dobbs gives a fine example of this conception of negligence: 
 
[S]uppose the defendant parks his car on the street, parallel to the curb, in a no-parking 
zone.  This conduct is negligent because it runs the [significant] risk that traffic will be 
impeded, but leaving a car parked in a no-parking zone does not negligently create a risk 
of injury to an able bodied pedestrian.  Courts are likely to say that the driver is not a 
proximate cause of the pedestrian’s harm from walking into the car, even though other 
risks made it negligent to park the car in such a way. 
 
DOBBS, TORTS § 181 at 446. 
Negligence.  “Negligence” is (i) a subset of all risks that are associated with an act.  
Specifically, it is any subset {A} of risks that should have been mitigated at the time the act 
occurred because (ii) the risk(s) in {A} was/were significant and (iii) the net social cost, if 
the act had been so modified as to counteract any significant risk(s) in {A}, would have been 
less than the unaltered act’s net social cost. 
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Identifying all negligent risks associated with a conduct is not necessary in practice.  
Instead, one should simply ask whether the litigated risk is a proximate risk.  If the answer is no, 
there is no need to discuss negligence – the claim can be dismissed for want of proximate risk.  If 
instead proximate risk exists, so too does the minimal form of negligence.116 
 
 
There is a hugely important difference between “duty” and the former two definitions: 
duty is judge-determined, but “negligence” and “proximate risk” are often jury questions.117  
Defining duty rigorously, therefore, is vital for judicial procedure. 
Duty in a negligence-based action arises in one of two fashions.  Per Part (i) of our 
definition, to decide whether the issue is suited for a jury (and hence, whether a duty exists), a 
judge makes his own preliminary conclusion whether a reasonable jury could find proximate risk 
and negligence.   
But as part (ii) of our definition evinces, there is a notable exception to this general rule.  
Courts are sometimes motivated by policy considerations to say that “no duty exists,” despite the 
fact that a reasonable jury could find negligence and proximate risk.118  What are these 
                                                
116 This is because a proximate risk is a “significant” risk not exemptable by decision analysis.  Such a 
risk, if it exists, also meets negligence conditions (ii) and (iii) stated above, meaning there is a set of 
negligent risks: a set with at least one element (the proximate risk).  This technique yields only the 
“weakest” form of negligence: only one negligent risk has been proven to exist.  Observe that asking 
about the litigated risk(s) first will also avoid the similarly Sisyphean task of identifying every risk 
associated with a particular act.  One simply asks whether the litigated causal proposition is epistemically 
possible. 
117 DOBBS, § 225 at 577 (“The most significant identity of limited or no-duty rules and immunity rules is 
that they are determined by judges or legislatures, not by juries.  That is an enormous contrast with the 
negligence issue, which is a jury determination whenever reasonable people can differ.”). 
118 Courts weighing duty have been remarkably lax in failing to separate negligence and proximate risk 
considerations – typically reserved for juries – from extra-negligence factors.  Rather, many courts heap 
negligence-related and extra-negligence factors together in a confused mass that makes duty appear 
increasingly like a jury question, rather than the question of law it is.  Accord DOBBS, TORTS § 229 at 
583 (“[Duty] factors are so numerous and so broadly stated that they can lead to almost any 
conclusion.… [H]owever, they are mainly the very same factors that determine the negligence question.  
Yet when the question is phrased as a question of duty, the judge, not the jury, will be the decision 
maker, even on such quintessential jury issues as foreseeability.”).  Consider, for example, the factors 
Duty.  Duty exists for a defendant in a negligence-based cause of action (i) if a reasonable 
jury could find negligence and proximate risk, (ii) unless there exists an ulterior policy 
motivation, unrelated to negligence and proximate risk, that compels the conclusion that 
liability should not attach to a defendant.  Duty likewise exists, (iii) even if no reasonable 
jury could find negligence or proximate risk (iv) if there exists an ulterior policy motivation, 
unrelated to negligence and proximate risk, that compels the conclusion that liability should 
attach to a defendant. 
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considerations?  They can be nearly anything courts believe should affect liability that are not 
part of typical liability assessment (i.e. negligence, proximate risk, scientific cause, and injury 
determination).  For example, the financial solvency of the defendant or a class of defendants,119 
the existence of a special relationship between litigating parties,120 the youthful age of a 
defendant,121 the scope of a governing statute (where applicable),122 the illegality or immorality 
of the tortious conduct,123 social custom,124 or any combination of the above125 have been such 
extra-negligence factors.126 
                                                                                                                                            
that are to be weighed under California’s test of duty:  (1) the extent to which the transaction was 
intended to affect the plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to him, (3) the degree of certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the 
injury suffered, (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, (6) the policy of preventing 
future harm, and (7) effective judicial administration, including guarding against limitless liability.  
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963), overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 441 
P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (rejecting Amaya’s holding, but not its duty factors).  Factor 1 assesses whether the 
tort case is based in negligence.  Factor 2 is akin to negligence’s foreseeability prong.  Factor 3 touches 
on actual causality and certainty of injury, two other traditional requirements for recovery.  Factor 4 is a 
vague description of proximate cause.  Factor 5 is a vague factor that could represent effectively 
anything, but if reduced to an “economic” set of considerations, represents the cost-benefit prong in the 
definition of negligence.  Factor 6 is related to the “significance” prong of the negligence definition.  
Thus, only Factor 7 – judicial administrative ease and curbing the risk of flood – appears to be a purely 
“extra-negligence” consideration. 
119 See Christopher Guzelian, Liability & Fear, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, § IV(F) (2004). 
120 Lough by Lough v. Rolla Women’s Clinic, 866 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. 1993) (“[I]n determining 
existence of a duty, [] a relationship between the parties where one is acting for the benefit of another [] 
plays a role.”). 
121 Except where children are engaged in adult activities (such as driving), courts typically hold that 
children under the age of six or seven are conclusively presumed to lack sufficient risk comprehension to 
be held liable.  See Price v. Kitsap Transit, 886 P.2d 556 (Wash. 1994). 
122 This concept – that no rule is intended to remedy each type of conceivable loss or harm – has been 
advocated particularly in the German civil law system, which refers to it as “Normzweck” (“Legal 
Purpose”).  See e.g., J.G. WOLF, DER NORMZWECK IM DELIKTSRECHT. EINE DISKUSSIONSBEITRAG 
(1962); E. VON CÄMMERER, DAS PROBLEM DES KAUSALZUSAMMENHANGE IM RECHTE, BESONDERS IM 
STRAFRECHTE (1956).  But see Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958) (holding 
defendant liable where his tug carried a kerosene lamp closer to the water than the required 8-foot 
minimum and exploded upon entering petroleum-laden waters, even though statutory prescription was 
only intended to prevent collisions). 
123 Zysk v. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d 721, 722 (Va. 1990) (“A party who consents to and participates in an 
immoral or illegal act cannot recover damages from other participants for the consequence of that act.”), 
quoting Miller v. Bennett, 56 S.E.2d 217, 218 (Va. 1949).  But see Doe v. Roe, 841 F. Supp. 444, 447 n.8 
(D.D.C. 1994) (condemning Zysk’s categorical bar because it ostensibly frustrates efforts to deter the 
spread of sexually transmitted diseases). 
124 See Richard Epstein, The Path to T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 
21 J. LEG. STUDIES 1 (1992) (theorizing which classes of defendants should be made liable under social 
custom). 
125 See e.g., Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Cal. 1992) (finding the duty supporting a 
direct victim negligent infliction of emotional distress case can have three alternative origins: “(1) it can 
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 The second form of duty (Elements (iii) and (iv)) is assessed independent of negligence 
or proximate risk considerations.  Intentional tort and strict liability duties often take this form, as 
do some categorical duty rules in negligence cases that are motivated by extra-negligence factors, 
such as special relationships. 
 
 
VI. JOINT TORTFEASORS 
  
A final contribution of Kiodynamic Theory is that it is the first tort theory to objectively 
allocate liability for a single injurious event among multiple alleged tortfeasors.  We report on 
how it does so in the following two subsections. 
 
VI(A). ENABLING TORT 
 Liability usually involves two parties: an injured plaintiff (“π”) and a tortfeasor (call him 
the “Secondary” (“2°”)).  This traditional liability arrangement appears as: 
 
Figure 3 
Traditional Tort 
 
 
Stanford Professor Robert Rabin, however, has described a hugely consequential shift, 
which he calls “enabling tort,” in how the common law assigns negligence-based liability:127 
                                                                                                                                            
be a duty assumed by defendant, or (2) it can be a duty imposed on defendant by law, or (3) it can be a 
duty arising out of a preexisting relationship between defendant and plaintiff.”). 
126 Because it is commonly accepted that judicial administrative ease should not come at the expense of 
individual justice, it is not usually explicitly cited as an extra-negligence factor.  Accord John C.P. 
Goldberg, 20th Century Tort, 90 GEO. L.J. __ (2002) (“The abstract idea of “administrability” – for 
which no criteria have been developed – can just as readily support decisions to limit or not limit 
particular forms of negligence liability.  Even if rendered adequately determinate, it often seems unable 
to explain limits on negligence liability.”). 
127 Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435 (1999).  This shift was actually predicted 
first by Hart and Honoré, see H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 284 (2nd ed. 
1985) (“[T]he law is in a transition from a stage at which liability was based almost exclusively on 
negligently causing harm to one in which it is based not merely on causing harm but also on exposing 
others to a risk of harm by providing other persons or things with the opportunity of doing harm.  
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[Enabling tort] comes to full flowering in our risk-saturated closing decades of the 
twentieth century – an epoch in which our perceptions of hazards in the neighborhood, 
workplace, and environment have reached unprecedented heights.  In this milieu, 
blameworthiness is not so readily confined as was the case in times past.  Beyond the 
immediate perpetrator of harm, the victim perceives the individual, or more often, the 
enterprise, that set the stage for the suffering that unfolded.  The Enabler.128  
 
Blaming Enablers adds a third, fourth, or more parties to the liability dance, depending on 
how far we want to extend “reachback” liability.  Rabin observes the Enabler does not himself 
commit the final act leading to injury,129 but is still liable for bolstering another’s tortious 
act.130  Assuming there is one “Enabler” (we will symbolize him as the “Primary” (“1°”)) 
demands modification of Figure 3’s traditional liability scheme as follows: 
 
Figure 4 
Facilitated Tort 
 
 
 
 Observe that the general form enabling tort takes – “facilitated tort” – is not new.  For 
example, law penalizes intentional facilitation of a crime (think of conspiracy),131 and 
                                                                                                                                            
Probably the future will see a considerable extension of the latter form of liability.”).  See also LEONARD 
TALMY, TOWARD A COGNITIVE SEMANTICS 504-09 (2000) (describing same). 
128 Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. at 437-38. 
129 Thus, enabling torts are not the same as “legally concurrent” causes of injury.  See Watts v. Smith, 134 
N.W.2d 194 (Mich. 1965) (plaintiff suffering an indivisible injury in two unrelated car crashes on the 
same day can recover jointly and severally from the unrelated tortfeasors). 
130 “[T]he essential element in enabler responsibility is that a dangerous ‘instrumentality’ has been put in 
the hands of a third-party with a foreseeable expectation that a ‘remote’ victim will suffer harm.”  Rabin, 
Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. at 450.  Rabin’s requirement that victims be “remote” (i.e. 
“innocent”) has been relaxed in many circumstances.  For example, in recent tobacco suits, individual 
smokers have been able to recover, despite their own complicity in smoking, because of negligent or 
intentional concealment by the tobacco industry of internally generated “addiction” data.  See note __ 
(right b4 whistleblower footnote), supra.  Criminal law too has assigned liability for those who 
negligently assist suicide victims.  See note ___ (right below), infra.   
131 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(a) (“A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to 
commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he:  (a) agrees with such 
other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct that constitutes such crime 
or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or   (b) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the 
planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.”). 
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manufacturers are strictly liable for defective product designs, even if another person is the direct 
cause of injury.132  
Enabling tort, conversely – that class of facilitated torts in which an Enabler suffers 
liability when it is specifically his negligence (as the term is customarily used) – has only recently 
begun to emerge:133 
 
Figure 5 
Enabling Tort 
 
                                                
132 For example, handgun manufacturers have been sued under strict liability theories for failure to put 
trigger-locks on their guns.  Compare Turley & Harrison, Strict Liability of Handgun Suppliers, 6 
HAMLINE L. REV. 285 (1983) (proposing strict liability for handgun manufacturers under the product 
liability principles of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1964)) with Martin v. Harrington and 
Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1206 and n.2 (7th Cir. 1984) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (discussing 
possible strict liability of handgun manufacturers under the ultrahazardous activity principles of 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 519-520 (1976)).  See also Soule v. General Motors Corporation, 882 
P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994) (holding auto manufacturer liable for injuries resulting from “defective” wheel and 
floorboard mounting when driver was struck by another driver who careened out of control). 
133 Traditional tort law did not hold Enablers liable.  Oliver Wendell Holmes rejected negligence-based 
enabler liability in a famous law review article, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894).  There, Holmes stated: 
 
 The principle seems to be pretty well established, in this country at least, that every one 
has a right to rely upon his fellow-men acting lawfully, and, therefore, is not 
answerable for himself acting upon the assumption that they will do so, however 
improbable it may be).   
 
Id.  Recognizing that his rule would provide too much shield from liability for certain Primaries, Holmes 
conceded that liability could be assessed against a Primary if “he intended to bring about consequences to 
which that unlawful act was necessary.” Id. at 11. Intent was Holmes’s dividing line for facilitator liability.  
This means he categorically rejected enabling tort. 
   Criminal law, in contrast, has already shifted to an “enabling model”; often it condemns negligent 
enabling acts where the Secondary tortfeasor commits a crime. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 
738 n. 70 (Mich. 1994) (“[T]here may be circumstances where one who recklessly or negligently 
provides the means by which another commits suicide could be found guilty of a lesser offense, such as 
involuntary manslaughter.”) (emphasis added), citing People v. Duffy 595 N.E.2d 814 (N.Y. 1992).  See 
also Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1961) (convicting husband of manslaughter 
after taunting drunken and possibly suicidal wife and showing her location of and means to use 
handgun); State v. Bier, 591 P.2d 1115 (Mt. 1979) (upholding husband’s negligent homicide conviction 
for placement of gun near drunken wife who committed suicide); Zinck v. Whelan, 294 A.2d 727, 730 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972) (“[a] substantial and growing number of jurisdictions, though still a 
minority, have held, in the ordinary fact case of theft [of car keys] and accident within a reasonable time 
thereafter that there are at least jury questions as to duty, negligence, and proximate cause [of a negligent 
car owner].”).  But see Mays v. City of E. St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[a] person 
whose negligence just sets the stage for a criminal act generally is not liable for ensuing injury.  For 
example, a person who negligently leaves a car unattended, with the keys in the ignition, is generally not 
liable to a person injured by a thief driving the car.”); Wise v. Superior Court, 272 Cal. Rptr. 222 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1990) (finding, in the absence of a special duty, that wife of a sniper who shot plaintiff from his 
roof is not liable for her failure to warn plaintiff about her husband). 
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The traditional prohibition on negligence-based “enabler” liability is ending.  A century 
after Oliver Wendell Holmes specifically rejected enabler liability for handgun manufacturers,134 
Rabin’s chief example of enabling tort is recent (sometimes successful135) litigation against the 
handgun industry.  The enabling theory is that these corporations share responsibility for handgun 
deaths and injuries as a result of conscious or negligent oversupply of markets with lax gun 
laws.136  
Other enabling torts have recently emerged: second-hand smoke litigation,137 defective 
products that the Secondary has negligently manipulated or altered,138 property owners with 
inadequate security measures in crime-ridden neighborhoods,139 negligent municipalities or 
                                                
134 Holmes posed an “enabling tort” hypothetical that must strike an eerily prophetic note with a modern 
crowd: 
 
Why is not a man who sells fire-arms answerable for assaults committed with pistols 
bought of him, since he must be taken to know the probability that, sooner or later, 
someone will buy a pistol of him for some unlawful end? 
 
Id. at 10.  Holmes concluded that the gun manufacturer shouldn’t be liable.   
135 Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding duty under negligent distribution theory); 
NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp.2d 435, 490-91 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting liability on other 
grounds, but acceding that “a duty of care could be imposed on gun manufacturers where there [is[ a 
‘tangible showing that defendants were a direct link in the causal chain that resulted in plaintiffs' injuries 
and ... defendants were realistically in a position to prevent the wrongs.’”), quoting Hamilton v. Beretta 
U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp.2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 
1999) (awarding damages under negligent distribution theory).  But cf. McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 
148 (2nd Cir. 1997) (finding bullet manufacturer did not have duty to control distribution of ammunition to 
protect against gunman's act in opening fire). 
136 Rabin, Enabling Torts at 435-36.   
137 See Broin v. Philip Dobbs Cos., 641 So.2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (certifying a class in an 
action by flight attendants for their alleged second-hand smoke injuries). 
138 Although most product liability cases proceed in strict liability (see note__, supra), a few Enablers 
have been held liable for negligence in product manufacture.  See Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 700 N.E.2d 
303, 308 (N.Y. 1998) (requiring duty to warn of foreseeable risks of harm even when there is no design 
defect liability). 
139 Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (landlord duty 
to protect against third-party violence); Tenney v. Atlantic Assocs., 594 N.W.2d 11 (Iowa 1999) 
(landlord liability for negligently supervising lock changes and key issuance where tenant was raped in 
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companies whose poor maintenance of defective roadways or property contributed to injuries 
caused by negligent drivers,140 vicarious employer liability or respondeat superior claims,141 
failure of an employer to provide work areas safe from third-party dangers,142 media or publisher 
“inducement” of negligent or reckless behavior,143 liability for Enablers where Mother Nature is 
the intervening cause of harm,144 lawsuits against both tobacco and the fast food industry in 
                                                                                                                                            
apartment); Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1996) (keys left in car 
where theft was likely means defendant may be proximate cause of harms done by thief while trying to 
escape police); Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd., 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 640 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (liable owner of 
parking complex in which plaintiff had been sexually assaulted, despite no prior incidents); Zuniga v. 
Housing Auth., 48 Cal. Rptr.2d 353, (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (public housing authority liable for failing to 
make arrests or erect safety barriers in building, where tenants died as a result of arson); Carlisle v. 
Ulysses Line Ltd., S.A., 475 So.2d 248 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985) (cruise line failed to warn or protect against 
masked gunman in port).  But see Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993) 
(no duty of shopping mall retail store owner to provide security absent previous incidents); Leslie G. v. 
Perry & Associates, 50 Cal. Rptr.2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting landlord liability where only 
evidence of negligence was expert's testimony that rapist was attracted to and entered the garage because 
of broken security gate). 
140 Bigbee v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 665 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1983) (jury question whether telephone company is 
liable when man in phone booth with a faulty door could not escape car veering onto sidewalk); 
McKenna v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 558 P.2d 1018 (Haw. 1977) (city liable for 
constructing defective road shoulder where negligent driver caused accident); Cruz v. City of New York, 
218 A.D.2d 546 (N.Y. 1995) (construction crew leaving hole in road where negligent driver drove into it, 
became immobilized, and a second car struck the first, injuring the second driver); Harvey v. Hansen, 
445 A.2d 1228 (Pa. Super. 1982) (sign obstruction by bushes facilitating vehicles’ collision). 
141 Warner Trucking, Inc. v. Carolina Casualty Ins. Co., 686 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. 1997) (employer may still 
be liable for intoxicated driver’s actions, even if driving in violation of company rule); McLean v. Kirby 
Co., 490 N.W.2d 229 (N.D. 1992) (employer hiring door-to-door salesman without conducting simple 
and revealing background check liable for salesman’s rape of potential buyer); Christensen v. Swensen, 
874 P.2d 125 (Utah 1994) (setting standards for vicarious employer liability for employee’s negligence 
toward third party during course of employment); Foster v. The Loft, Inc., 526 N.E.2d 1309 (Mass. Ct. 
App. 1988) (failure to properly screen formerly convicted bartender who punched plaintiff). 
142 Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 461-62 (1947) (holding railroad company liable for assault upon 
woman employee and noting “[p]etitioner alleged in effect that respondent was aware of conditions 
which created a likelihood that a young woman performing the duties required of petitioner would suffer 
just such an injury as was in fact inflicted upon her. That the foreseeable danger was from intentional or 
criminal misconduct is irrelevant; respondent nonetheless had a duty to make reasonable provision 
against it.  Breach of that duty would be negligence, and we cannot say as a matter of law that petitioner's 
injury did not result at least in part from such negligence.”); Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 
N.E.2d 666 (N.Y. 1980) (employer who failed to erect adequate traffic barricade liable to plaintiff 
construction worker struck and injured by negligent driver). 
143  Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975) (disc jockey announcing that first listeners to 
drive to his location would win prize liable for vehicular death caused by listeners’ reckless driving).  But 
cf.  Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (where writer conceded intent in 
publishing tutorial on murder was to assist crime perpetrators, liability attaches); Olivia N. v. National 
Broadcasting Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981) (negligence alone not enough to create liability for 
television broadcaster’s inducing viewer to commit “copycat” crime). 
144 Gallick v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 372 U.S. 108 (1963) (finding jury question of employer’s negligence 
where employee working near a standing pool of water was bitten by a insect and suffered life-
threatening infection); Bradford v. Universal Construction Co., Inc., 644 So.2d 864 (Ala. 1994) 
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which the plaintiffs cast themselves as “remote victims” as a result of the products’ purported 
addictiveness,145 and perhaps even crime-enabling speech.146 
While these examples confirm enabling tort’s newfound popularity, many 
counterexamples persist.147  Such inconsistency must be explained.  Rabin, like Richard Posner 
before him,148 asserts that the “inconsistency” in applying enabling tort, is nothing more than 
                                                                                                                                            
(unsecured plywood sheets that wind blew into plaintiff); Lanz v. Pearson, 475 N.W.2d 601, 603 (Iowa 
1991) (Act of God jury instruction denied because icy and obscured highway conditions could have been 
“reasonably anticipated”).  But see Memphis & Charlesstown Railroad Co. v. Reeves, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 
176 (1869) (no liability for delayed tobacco shipments destruction due to “unexpected” and “sudden and 
extraordinary” flood); Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 887 P.2d 848 (Utah 
1994) (“no duty” to protect against “unforeseeable” flooding).  At least one court has noted where a 
defendant was negligent and the inclement conditions were extraordinary and “unforeseeable,” the 
liability “concurs” and the defendant remains liable for the whole of the harm done.  Lang v. 
Wonnenberg, 455 N.W.2d 832 (N.D. 1990).  This ruling is equivalent to a joint-and-several liability rule 
that imposes all financial burden on the Primary where the Secondary is not reachable.  
145 For example, class action attorneys have recently targeted the fast food industry in enabling-style 
lawsuits.  See Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F.Supp.2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing lawsuit for 
lack of specificity against McDonald’s restaurants for allegedly contributing to minors’ obesity).  The 
theory for recovery is that these fast food chains have concealed their aim and internal research efforts to 
improve the taste of its calorie-laden food products to make them more “addicting,” and that these foods, 
consumed in excess, contribute to the myriad health conditions associated with obesity.  See generally 
ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN MEAL (2d ed. 2002) 
(describing emergence of “flavor industry” to increase sales of American fast food products).  Similar 
lawsuits against tobacco companies are now familiar.  Rabin disputes that these are true enabling torts, 
insomuch as the injured third parties are also responsible.  Nonetheless, by asserting the “addictiveness” 
of these products, the plaintiffs are clearly trying to shift liability from themselves to the Enablers to 
conform their lawsuits to the now-recognized form of enabling tort. Accord Little v. York County Earned 
Income Tax Bureau, 481 A.2d 1194, 1201 (Pa. Super 1984) (woman incarcerated for failure to pay 
income taxes can recover emotional harms damages from negligent tax advisor). 
146 Eugene Volokh, Crime-facilitating Speech,  57 STAN. L. REV. __ (2005). 
147 Poskus v. Lombardo's of Randolph, 670 N.E.2d 383 (Mass. 1996) (no Enabler liability for negligent 
valet service when police officer suffered injury arresting car thief who had already abandoned vehicle); 
Sheehan v. City of New York, 354 N.E.2d 832 (N.Y. 1976) (no Enabler liability where bus in violation 
of traffic regulations did not pull over to curb when stopping and was struck from behind by negligently 
driven garbage truck, injuring bus passenger); Johnson v. Angretti, 73 A.2d 666 (Pa. 1950) (no liability 
for bus company where bus had negligently stopped in the road and another driver negligently tried to 
overtake the bus, but struck and killed oncoming car’s driver); Newton v. South Carolina Public 
Railways Comm’n, 462 S.E.2d 266 (S.C. 1995) (defendant employed to maintain malfunctioning railroad 
crossing signal not liable when plaintiff stopped as a result of signal and was struck from behind by 
negligent driver who failed to halt); Phan Son Van v. Pena, 990 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1999) (storeowner 
who negligently and illegally sold alcohol to minors not liable for subsequent murder commission); 
Brewer v. Teano, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (no recovery against deceased’s estate for 
emotional harms stemming from arrest and prosecution where plaintiff’s car had been struck by 
deceased’s, but plaintiff fled the scene in apparent fear of the deceased and was arrested on suspicion of 
felony hit and run).  Other counterexamples are sprinkled throughout notes ___, (cite last group) supra. 
148 Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES 29 (1972) (arguing that responsibility, 
especially in civil law, should be placed on the person best placed to avoid the loss most cheaply). 
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proper determination of which party is best suited to bear liability.149  This view equates liability 
with capability or suitability to provide social insurance.150  However appealing Rabin’s theory 
may be prescriptively,151 it isn’t the motivation behind enabling tort’s new popularity.  Courts 
assume much more righteous airs, invoking terms such as “fairness” or “morality” to justify the 
reachback liability they place on Primaries. These are judicial fighting words, not bland cost-
benefit musings.152 
Kiodynamic theorists assert that the reason for confusion and incorrect theories about 
when enabling tort is the suitable form of liability stems from a lack of rigorous quantification the 
Primary’s and Secondary’s respective risk contributions.  Without knowing how much risk of a 
future injury an agent contributes, it is an utterly futile proposition to apportion to him any 
particular amount of blame, or to have confidence that that liability is a “deterrent” commensurate 
with that actor’s risk contribution.  Yet courts are universally lacking a rigorous risk 
quantification metric (like EBL and decision analysis).153  Moreover, varied and inconsistent 
                                                
149 For example, Rabin concludes for crime-ridden property cases: “[n]ot only is the renter in a better 
position than the tenant to adopt precautionary measures, but the renter is better situated than the police 
to diminish the risk of criminal assault on the premises – the police, after all, cannot be expected to patrol 
the interiors of large residential apartment buildings and to exercise vigilance in private spaces.”  Rabin, 
Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. at 444.  Is this really why Enabler liability is increasing? 
150 Rabin concedes that an implicit but important motivation behind some enabling torts may simply be an 
attempt to reach solvent pocketbooks. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. at 444 (suggesting a 
major motivation of enabling tort “is the inability to effectively reach the putative [Secondary] 
wrongdoer himself, either through criminal or tort sanctions.  This is the…link to creating responsibility 
for enabling behavior.” ).  
151 Kiodynamic Theory rejects Rabin’s theory as inconsistent with the major goals of tort law.  See 
Section I, supra. 
152 Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 719 (2nd Cir. 1964) (“The discredited notion that only 
the last wrongful act can be a [liable] cause [is] a notion as faulty in logic as it is wanting in fairness.”); 
Michael S. Moore, The Metaphysics of Causal Intervention, 88 CAL. L. REV. 827, 828 (2000) (“It is 
morality, not legal policy, that tells us that actions that cause harm are more blameworthy than those that 
merely attempt or risk such harm.”). Accord Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 543 (“FELA does not make the 
employer the insurer of the safety of his employees while they are on duty.  The basis of his liability is 
his negligence, not the fact that injuries occur.”), quoting Ellis v. Union Pacific R. Co., 329 U.S. 649, 653 
(1947).  See also note __ (restatement note in Section I), supra. 
153 It is evident that courts desire some workable risk calculus in enabling tort, just as they desire it in 
general.  Consider, for instance, one federal court’s implicit adoption of a primitive risk assessment for 
handgun liability: 
  
 “Duty” at its essence is a question of policy.  While there is a general reluctance to 
impose liability where harm results in part from the conduct of third-party tortious or 
criminal conduct,…a duty of care could be imposed on gun manufacturers where there 
was a tangible showing that the defendants were a direct link in the causal chain that 
resulted in the plaintiffs' injuries and the defendants were realistically in a position to 
prevent the wrongs.  A showing of a direct link between the negligence and damage to 
the public at large ensures that there is no threat of a specter of limitless liability.  
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terminology obscures the causal principles behind “enablement.”154  Absent risk quantification 
and a solid understanding of the causal principles that underlie tort law, we should hardly be 
surprised that recent commitment to enabling torts appears to some as proof that tort is “out of 
control” or “arbitrarily” decided.  Yet, as we report next, Kiodynamic theorists offer a new 
consistent method for establishing when to (and when not to) extend liability to enablers. 
 
VI(B).  KIODYNAMIC MODES OF JOINT TORTFEASOR LIABILITY: TRADITIONAL, 
ENABLING, AND LEAPFROGGING LIABILITY 
 The usual test for assessing division of liability among multiple parties asks whether a 
Secondary is a superseding cause.155  In the traditional model (see Figure 3, supra), a 
superseding cause exists and only the Secondary is liable.  In enabling tort, no superseding cause 
exists and both Enabler and Secondary are liable (see Figure 5, supra).   
                                                                                                                                            
Important in the determination is that a plaintiff not rely merely on the foreseeability of 
harm to attempt to hold all members of an industry liable, but rather present evidence 
tending to show to what degree the risk of injury was enhanced by the presence of 
negligently or intentionally harmfully marketed and distributed guns. 
 
NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp.2d 435, 490-91 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (emphasis added). 
154 Commentators, including courts, have sometimes described Rabin’s “enablement” as “indirect 
causation.”  Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 83 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 
habitat alteration as “indirect cause of harm” for interpretation of Endangered Species Act); Erich J. 
Greene & John M. Darley, Effects of Necessary, Sufficient, and Indirect Causation on Judgments of 
Criminal Liability, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 429, 439-41 (1998).  Others have indicated that language 
patterns may be to blame for proper understanding of enabling causality.  For example, one pair of 
authors has shown psychological differences prompt some to write statements such as “the plant 
bloomed” and others to write “the gardener caused the plant to bloom.”  The authors contend that the 
linguistic similarity of these statements encourages judges to bypass causality issues without critically 
considering causal differences in these statements.  Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Causation, 
Contribution, and Legal Liability: An Empirical Study, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 265, 279 (2001). 
155 Dobbs attempts to explain superceding cause’s motivation, but like others before him, (see ROBERT E. 
KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1963); Glanville Williams, The Risk Principle, 77 LAW 
QUARTERLY REV. 179 (1961); Warren A. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. 
REV. 371 (1939)), is linguistically hampered by a lack of firm definitions for negligence and proximate 
risk: 
 
A ruling that an intervening actor is a superseding cause embodies the dual conclusion 
that the intervening actor should be responsible, and that the original actor, in spite of his 
causal negligence, should not.… [I]n contemporary law, when courts then ask what 
counts as a superseding cause, …[t]he rule is that if the intervening cause itself is part of 
the risk negligently created by the defendant, or if it is reasonably foreseeable at the time 
of the defendant’s negligent conduct, then it is not a superceding cause at all.  In that 
case, the defendant is not relieved of liability merely because some other person or force 
triggered the injury. 
 
DOBBS § 186 at 462, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 442A & 442B. 
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The existence of a superseding cause usually turns on “reasonable foreseeability.”156  
We already have seen the problems with “foreseeability”; to be consistent in allocating liability, 
we need a better delimiting definition of superseding cause. 
Two fact patterns can clarify what “superseding cause” is getting at.  Construction 
employee A is working on a busy public highway near traffic.  Employer B, without statutory 
obligation to do so,157 erects a barricade to protect A and others.  An automobile veers out of 
control and crashes through the barricade.  Stronger barricades could have slowed, perhaps 
stopped, the careening car.  A is injured by the car.  B is probably liable to A.158 
Now imagine a permutation:  an airplane crashes on the highway, slides down the road 
and through the barricade.  It causes exactly the same injuries to A as the car collision would 
have.  There are barricades that can shield against sliding airplanes, but they are quite expensive.  
B is probably not liable to A.159 
Most people should have an intuitive understanding of the difference in these liability 
results: an airplane strike seems “extraordinary,” a car collision seems “normal.”  Our intuition, 
while correct, conceals that there are two pertinent differences.  First, the likelihood of being 
struck by an airplane while working on an urban street is orders of magnitude lower than the 
likelihood of being struck by a car.160  Thus, airplane strikes are less likely to amount to a 
“significant” risk than vehicular collisions.  The second difference is a cost-benefit consideration; 
                                                
156 Duphily v. Delaware Electric Coop., Inc., 662 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1995) (“If the intervening 
negligence of a third party was reasonably foreseeable, the original tortfeasor is liable for his negligence 
because the causal connection between the original tortuous act and the resulting injury remains 
unbroken.  If, however, the intervening negligence was not reasonably foreseeable, the intervening act 
supersedes and becomes the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, thus relieving the original 
tortfeasor of liability.”). 
157 The issue of inferring negligence or proximate risk from statutory non-compliance complicates risk 
analysis, and thus, liability analysis.  Statutes can be generated by politics or other factors, rather than 
pure risk analysis.  If a statute is divorced from optimal risk-based policy, non-compliance doesn’t mean 
a person is negligent, yet the legal presumption usually given to non-compliance is that the person is 
negligent.  Cass Sunstein has recently championed the evident way to solve this deadlock: create 
administrative and legislative policies that are rooted in risk analysis, not politics.  CASS SUNSTEIN, RISK 
AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2002).  If Sunstein’s vision were achieved, 
illegality would become a better proxy of negligence or proximate risk. 
158 See Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666 (N.Y. 1980) (finding liability for this fact 
pattern).  We are assuming that the cause of action is negligence, not workman’s compensation. 
159 See Doss v. Town of Big Stone Gap, 134 S.E. 563 (Va. 1926) (no liability for alleged negligence of 
city in forcing vehicular detour around impassable road where decedent was struck and killed by an 
airplane while on detour). 
160 Kimberly M. Thompson et al., The Risk of Groundling Fatalities from Unintentional Airplane Crashes, 
21 RISK ANALYSIS 1025 (2001) (estimating the total lifetime risk of a groundling’s being killed by an 
airplane to be approximately nine in ten million persons, but with the risk “rapidly declining” outside the 
first 2 miles around an airport). 
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the airplane barricade is much more expensive than a vehicular barricade.  Even if the risks of an 
airplane strike and a vehicular strike were equally likely, the marginal risk reduction benefit from 
investment in a vehicular barricade would be greater than from investment in airplane barricades.  
In a world with finite monetary resources, Kiodynamic Theory urges investment of risk-reducing 
dollars in the most efficient manner possible. 
These examples make evident that “reasonable foreseeability” (the fulcrum on which 
superseding cause currently rests) should be replaced by our definition proximate risk (based on a 
concept of prioritizing resources to address the most social costly and prevalent risks first).  
Kiodynamic Theory accordingly rewords the superseding cause test: 
 
If a tortfeasor creates at least one proximate risk and if relevant duty exists, 
there is no superseding cause for that tortfeasor. 
 
 A Secondary’s acts may (1) cause new, additional risks; or (2) amplify existing risks.  If a 
Secondary creates a new risk, a Primary obviously shares no liability.  But if a Secondary 
amplifies a risk to which the Primary also contributed, multiparty liability allocation is not as 
simple. One must then ask: what would the risk have been in the absence of the Secondary’s 
behavior?  Would the Primary’s risk have been “significant” on its own?  To see this concept 
better, consider the following diagram (assume the “significant” risk threshold is 0.3): 
 
Figure 6 
Risk “Significance”: A Requirement for Individual Liability 
 
 
 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 48 
To set liability for jointly caused risks, it is essential to quantitatively determine whether 
that fraction of the total risk attributable to a Primary is a proximate risk on its own.  Even if the 
Primary’s risk contribution is “significant,” his actions may be economically justified and 
therefore still not create a proximate risk.161  But if not, the judge will conclude that a reasonable 
jury could find the Primary to have created a proximate risk.162 
To assess a Secondary’s liability for amplifying an existing risk, the same method applies: 
first one subtracts the Primary’s risk contribution from the total risk.  If the remaining risk 
fraction attributable to the Secondary is “significant” – and observe that nothing invariably 
requires the “significant” risk cut-off be the same for a Secondary and a Primary – the Secondary 
has contributed an independent proximate risk if his act is unexcused by decision analysis or 
duty.163  
 Up to now, we have discussed two ways liability is allocated among multiple tortfeasors: 
traditional and enabling tort.  Kiodynamic Theory recognizes a third form of liability allocation, 
“leapfrogging tort.”  Leapfrogging tort, like enabling tort or traditional tort, involves a Secondary 
                                                
161 See Section IV(B), supra. 
162 Even this doesn’t mean Primary liability follows automatically.  Procedurally, a judge who undertakes 
these steps is determining duty, not proximate risk. A policy consideration, unrelated to negligence or 
proximate risk, could still militate against finding a duty.  But if there is no such policy concern, the case 
goes to a jury, which will (re)deliberate the issues of negligence and proximate risk to set liability.  (Note 
that even after being released to a jury, cases naturally can be dismissed on other grounds such as failure 
to demonstrate actual causality or injury, or for procedural or jurisdictional reasons.) 
163 Note that every element of proximate risk must be met, independent of others’ risk contributions, for a 
Secondary to be liable.  There is a temptation, for instance, to erroneously place liability on the 
Secondary if his amplification of extant risk causes the total risk – not his individual contribution to that 
total – to be significant.  See Lipke v. Celotex Corp., 153 Ill. App. 3d 498, 509 (1st Dist. 1987), which 
held:  
 
 [O]ne guilty of negligence cannot avoid responsibility merely because another person 
is guilty of negligence contributing to the same injury.  Under Romine v. City of 
Watseka (1950), 341 Ill. App. 370, 377, 91 N.E.2d 76, where such guilt exists, ‘it is no 
defense that some other person, or thing contributed to bring about the result for which 
damages are claimed. Either or both parties are liable for all damages sustained’. Thus, 
the fact that plaintiff used a variety of asbestos products does not relieve defendant of 
liability for his injuries. Evidence of such exposure is not relevant. 
 
 Id. (emphasis added). See also Kochan v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 242 Ill. App.3d 781 (5th Dist. 
1993) (same). 
  Further, a Secondary may amplify extant risk – perhaps even “significantly” – but has still not 
created a proximate risk if decision analysis exonerates his act.  In such an instance, liability for the 
Secondary’s “significant” but economically justifiable risk increase could be assigned jointly and 
severally to those tortfeasors who did create a proximate risk of that injury. 
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who (1) creates a new (additional) proximate risk;164 or (2) amplifies an existing risk of the 
Primary’s. An example:  Negligent driver A creates risks of injurious collision with each of two 
pedestrians, B and C.  To escape injury, B dives out of the car’s path.  A swerves and grazes C.  
Simultaneously, B’s dive knocks C down, breaking C’s arm.  This broken arm would not have 
occurred if A alone had grazed C.  C can recover against A, but not B, for his broken arm.165  
The conceptual premise of leapfrogging tort is subtle to catch, particularly because it is 
unintuitive that the last contributing agent in a causal chain known to lead to harm assumes no 
liability.  Yet this is exactly what sometimes happens.166  The implication of leapfrogging tort is 
that all liability bypasses the Secondary actor, and accrues entirely to Enablers upstream (in the 
two-person model, to the Primary).  If those Enablers also did not individually create proximate 
risks, there simply is no liability. 
 Kiodynamic Theory corrects perennial oversights about why enabling tort is coming into 
vogue.  Enabling tort always should have been recognized.  The long-running failure to do so 
consistently is attributable to misconceptions about risk.  How could courts expect to correctly 
identify multiple proximate risks resulting in a single harm, as in enabling tort, when judges have 
enough trouble identifying single proximate risks?  Undoubtedly similar misapprehensions are 
why leapfrogging tort has not even been named before.  But under Kiodynamic Theory, torts 
involving two causal actors can result in three distinct modes of liability assignment:167 
                                                
164 This includes the class of “rescue” cases – in which a person who aids the victim of a negligent 
tortfeasor is himself injured in the rescue attempt.  In the rescue cases, the rescuer has created a novel risk 
of harm – injury to himself – rather than having amplified the extent or likelihood of injuries to the 
original victim.  See Thomas v. Garner, 672 N.E.2d 52 (Ill. 1996); Solomon v. Shuell, 457 N.W.2d 669 
(Mich. 1990); Wagner v. International Ry., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921). 
165 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 445(c)(3) at 476 (describing leapfrogging tort by example: 
“A negligently drives his car so as to endanger B in the street.  To escape being hit B leaps out of the 
way.  In doing so he knocks down C, who was not in the path of the car.  A’s liability to C will depend 
upon whether he should have realized when driving that such a person in the vicinity of B might be 
injured by his negligent driving.”). 
166 Consider, for instance, emotional harms or fear claims.  In such cases, risk communicators – who often 
are the ultimate “cause” of fear – almost universally escape liability, while physical injurers who have 
allegedly placed a plaintiff at physical risk must pay the entirety of the fear or emotional harm claim, 
sometimes even if that fear is irrational.  See generally Christopher P. Guzelian, Liability & Fear, 65 
OHIO ST. L.J. 713 (2004). 
167 We have been working with the simplest form of enabling tort: cases with two alleged tortfeasors.  But 
the principles are generalizable.  If there are N accused tortfeasors, liability should accrue to however 
many of those actors have created independent proximate risks.  To do this in practice, one should 
calculate the total risk, and then determine each of the N actors’ potential proximate risk creations by 
beginning farthest upstream in the causal chain.  Each layer of risk augmentation or additional risk 
creation, regardless of whether it amounts to a proximate risk, should be subtracted from the total risk 
magnitude or number of risks, until the last tortfeasor (by definition, the only non-Enabler) is reached.  
Presumably, if there are numerous risk communicators who each created a proximate risk, they are 
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Figure 7 
Kiodynamic Theory’s Modes of Liability 
 
 
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Legal scholars complain that traditional tort theory is inadequate to address the expanding 
scope of known and pervasive risks of the post-industrial world.168  The alleged risks that are 
increasingly finding their way into litigation are instead more complex and less intuitive to 
establish.  Risks are also dynamic constructs, subject to change, revision, or elimination as risk 
assessment generates greater knowledge about their causal and numerical natures (or 
alternatively, their non-existence).169  Tort must accurately reflect both the changing set of risks 
and the dynamic nature of risk analysis. 
                                                                                                                                            
jointly-and-severally liable, along with any proximately negligent physical injurers, for a resulting injury.  
To the extent that a state does not recognize joint-and-several liability, other liability apportioning 
mechanisms may have to be introduced, such as market share liability.  See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 
F.Supp.2d 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (imposing collective liability for sellers of .25 caliber handguns who 
negligently marketed handguns, such that they were too likely to be used illegally and criminally by 
teenagers); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989) (market share approach adopted 
in DES cases); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984) (liability in proportion to risk 
imposed, with market share relevant to determining that risk proportion).  But see Smith v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990) (rejecting market share approach to collective liability for DES 
production). 
168 See note __ (Goldberg intro quote), supra. 
169 Adhering to stare decisis and precedence makes less sense than anywhere else in the field of law when 
stating whether a causal proposition is a risk per EBL. 
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 Most jurists and scholars concur that the primary aim of tort law is (efficient) risk 
deterrence and recompense.  Thus, this article set about asking and preliminarily answering two 
brief questions – first, “What is a risk?” and second, “How does one objectively determine which 
risks to deter through tort?”  
The typical Industrial Era attorney would have answered these questions by immediately 
launching into a lengthy, and at times muddied, discussion of duty and breach (negligence), and 
proximate cause.  He would have given short nod to general or specific causation170 and injury – 
issues that were rarely contentious.   
 But as risk knowledge has improved and as risks have changed, the population of risks 
alleged in modern courtrooms is not the same as in 1930.  A new theory of tort – Kiodynamic 
Theory – accommodates these changes.  Kiodynamic Theory hones understandings of long-
sensed, but poorly articulated tort intuitions in three ways, and offers one significant prescriptive 
modification to tort.  
 First, contrary to its many everyday definitions, the word “risk” has a single exact 
meaning in Kiodynamic Theory.   To a Kiodynamic theorist, a risk must be objectively known to 
be possible (“epistemically possible”).  Put differently, Kiodynamics prescribes that a specific 
alleged stimulus must be objectively known to cause a particular harm before liability can even 
begin to be considered.171 
 Second – and in the only notable break with traditional tort intuition – many Kiodynamic 
proponents advocate modifying tort by permitting compensation only for “significant” risks.  This 
particular brand of risk (which must also result in injury, in fact, to be redressable by tort) is (1) 
widespread and (2) likely to be injurious.  Similar to common regulatory practice, this 
prescriptive constraint seeks to sensibly prioritize risk deterrence, given limited judicial 
resources.172 
 Third, Kiodynamic Theory invokes decision analysis – the method for formal, 
quantitative risk analysis universally familiar to risk analysts – to elucidate risk tradeoffs and 
make decisions about a risk’s costs and benefits.  With its empirical grounding, decision analysis 
                                                
170 The leading legal treatise on causation, H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2nd 
ed. 1985), is out-of-print.  Causation, the fulcrum of Kiodynamic-based tort law, is undoubtedly being 
under-addressed currently. 
171 See Sections II & III, supra. 
172 See Section IV(A), supra. 
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improves upon other cost-benefit models, which are typically too theoretical or assumption-laden 
for practical use.173 
 Finally, courts have long desired and intuitively but unsuccessfully sought an objective 
method for apportioning liability for a single injury among multiple alleged tortfeasors.  
Kiodynamic Theory is the first tort theory to formally present such a method.174 
   
Kiodynamics is indeed in one aspect (risk prioritization) a purely prescriptive theory that 
does not pretend to capture past legal trends.175  Other than risk prioritization, however, 
Kiodynamics is not a prescriptive theory, but rather a rigorous restatement and clarification of 
longstanding tort intuitions.  Kiodynamics only seems prescriptive and novel because it uses new 
vocabulary and is a uniquely demanding, quantitative, and precise way of thinking about 
traditional tort concepts. 
It is true that Kiodynamics rejects many decisions as improper.  While some will accuse 
it of being a purely prescriptive theory dressed in explanatory clothing, it must be understood that 
Kiodynamics is often times not criticizing the aims of decisionmakers in cases it declares 
“wrongly” decided.  Rather, because of its rigorous nature, Kiodynamic Theory is uniquely 
capable of discovering that judges, lacking access to the powerfully objective and precise tools of 
EBL (evidence based logic), decision analysis, and Kiodynamic multiparty liability allocation, 
have often reached conclusions they simply did not intend to make. Indeed, Kiodynamic 
advocates contend that had courts been able to apply Kiodynamic methods earlier in history, 
many outcomes would have been different, holding judges’ and juries’ tort philosophies constant. 
 Kiodynamic Theory holds great promise as a modern theory of tort.176  In a complex 
world, Kiodynamic Theory is better suited than its predecessors to achieving the age-old jurist’s 
                                                
173 See Section IV(B), supra. 
174 See Section VI, supra. 
175 The argument of those Kiodynamicists who advocate risk prioritization (and not all Kiodynamic 
thinkers do) is that even assuming the goal of tort were solely corrective justice – the right to have one’s 
day in court – risk prioritization is logically necessary, as long as a jurisdiction’s case load overtaxes 
thorough judicial review of each case.  This conclusion is because if courts can only sufficiently address 
a certain number/category of cases, then each jurisdiction effectively has a "race" system of case 
prioritization -- whoever files suit first, bangs one’s fist the loudest, etc. gets more adequate redress, 
while others may receive shoddy judicial attention (or to avoid such treatment, may simply settle the case 
under suboptimal terms).  Kiodynamics contends that if individual justice is constrained (and the Soviet 
command-control nature of tort law does that), then why not do so sensibly according to some other tenet 
of tort – namely risk deterrence? 
176 The next step in Kiodynamic Theory’s evolution – critical if Kiodynamic Theory is to sustain merit – 
must be for its proponents to spell out exactly how the process of establishing a risk proposition should 
look.  Scientific investigation is capable of establishing nearly any risk as epistemic if a causal 
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wish to efficiently marshall judicial resources towards deterring society’s most pressing risks and 
fairly recompense those harmed by those risks. 
                                                                                                                                            
proposition is stated too broadly.  Conversely, if a risk proposition is put too narrowly, scientific 
knowledge will nearly always be incapable of speaking to such an overly restrictive proposition.  What is 
therefore required is an objective process for framing the appropriate scope of the cause “A” and effect 
“B” at issue in a particular claim, then assessing by evidence-based methods whether a risk indeed exists 
as a general causal proposition.  It will then be up to the trier of fact to assess through the introduction of 
case-specific evidence whether the plaintiff’s individual circumstances meet that general risk’s pattern. 
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